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TRUST & TRANSPARENCY: PROMOTING 
EFFICIENT CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
THROUGH FIDUCIARY-BASED DISCOURSE 
MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER
 
ABSTRACT 
Could embracing the philosophy of “encapsulated trust” as the basis 
for a fiduciary duty of disclosure improve the integrity and effectiveness of 
corporate communications? The question arises because a tragedy of 
transparency threatens the viability of the burgeoning corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) movement, where consumers and investors employ 
various social, environmental, or ethical screening criteria before 
purchasing a company‟s stock or products. In an efficient market, fully 
informed consumers and investors could reward companies that engage in 
CSR by purchasing their products or stock and, conversely, punish 
companies that fail to engage in desired practices by refusing to purchase 
their products or stock. Unfortunately, corporations are increasingly 
engaging in a sort of “strategic ambiguity” in their public 
communications—an ambiguity made possible by a variety of static yet 
inconsistent standards regarding the collection, auditing, and 
dissemination of information regarding CSR practices. Consumers and 
investors simply cannot trust the existing disclosure regime to provide 
reliable information necessary to monitor CSR compliance. That lack of 
trust will cause the market for CSR to collapse, as consumers and 
investors stop offering rewards for responsible business behavior.  
The Article suggests solving that disclosure tragedy by using the 
philosophy of “encapsulated trust” to reshape the existing fiduciary duties 
governing officers and directors. In simple terms, encapsulated trust 
constitutes a rational expectation that others will take our interests into 
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account when determining what course of action to pursue. Applied in the 
context of corporate disclosures on CSR, encapsulated trust would require 
officers and directors to demonstrate they took into account shareholder 
preferences regarding the timing, content, and form of corporate 
disclosures. In essence, the duty is a process-based standard that relies on 
continual discourse to improve the integrity of disclosure practices. In 
contrast to static statutory disclosure rules, an emphasis on improved 
discourse between the corporations and shareholders would promote 
greater efficiency in corporate communication by attending more 
accurately to evolving consumer and investor disclosure preferences. 
Moreover, the focus on greater discourse within the corporate setting 
would also lead to enhanced ethical practices by corporate actors and 
their counsel.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Could embracing the philosophy of ―encapsulated trust‖ as the basis for 
a fiduciary duty of disclosure improve the integrity and effectiveness of 
corporate communications?  
The question arises because, despite a host of federal and state statutes 
mandating disclosure of various corporate practices, corporations seem 
reluctant to disclose fully what consumers and investors want to know, 
when they want the information, and in a manner they find accessible. For 
example, in January 2009, USA Today reported that Monster.com ―quietly 
posted an online notice Friday disclosing that its customer databases had 
been hacked for the second time in six months.‖1 The disclosure did not 
occur until five days after Monster.com became aware of the breach.
2
 
Around the same time, Heartland Payment Systems learned of a massive 
security breach that potentially put at risk the financial information of 100 
million credit card users.
3
 A week after confirming the breach and several 
months after beginning the investigation, Heartland ultimately disclosed 
the breach publically—on Inauguration Day, when other news obviously 
occupied the headlines.
4
 Those are just two of many examples where 
corporations arguably failed to disclose—or to disclose effectively—
important information relevant to consumers and investors.  
Ineffective corporate disclosures become especially problematic in the 
context of the CSR movement, where consumers and investors employ 
various social, environmental, or ethical screening criteria before 
purchasing a company‘s stock or products. As the bases upon which 
consumers and investors make purchasing decisions grow, calls for greater 
 
 
 1. Byron Acohido, Hackers Hit Monster.com‟s Customer Data Again, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 
2009 (emphasis added). 
 2. For a criticism of the timing, content, and manner of the disclosure, see Mike Dailey, An 
Open Letter to Monster.com Management (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://daileymuse.com/2009/01/ 
an-open-letter-to-monstercom-management. 
 3. Byron Acohido, Hackers Breach Credit System Heartland Processes Millions of Purchases, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2009.  
 4. Jaikumar Vijayan, Heartland Data Breach Sparks Security Concerns In Payment Industry: 
Lack Of Details, Company‟s Size Spur Questions About How System Intrusion Happened, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do? 
command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9126608; see also Jaikumar Vijayan, Heartland‟s Breach 
Disclosure Timing Raises Eyebrows, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://blogs. 
computerworld.com/heartland_breach: 
The timing of Heartland Payment Systems‘ announcement that its networks had been broken 
into last year by unknown intruders has raised a few eyebrows. Some see yesterday‘s 
announcement as an attempt by the Princeton, N.J.-based payment card processor to bury the 
bad news on a day when the media and the public at large were totally consumed with 
President Barack Obama‘s inauguration.  
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corporate transparency increase as well. Excessive amounts of disclosure, 
or communication of poor quality information, can actually impede rather 
than promote corporate accountability. Unintentional obfuscation may turn 
into bald deception, as corporations seek market advantages by promoting 
a false socially responsible image. Absent effective dissemination of 
reliable information regarding socially responsible business practices, a 
tragedy of transparency may result that threatens the basic viability of the 
CSR movement. 
The basic problem of corporate disclosures on CSR represents a 
version of the classic Prisoner‘s Dilemma. In an efficient market, fully 
informed consumers and investors could reward companies that engage in 
CSR by purchasing their products or stock, and, conversely, punish 
companies that fail to engage in desired practices by refusing to purchase 
their products or stock. Unfortunately, corporations increasingly engage in 
a sort of ―strategic ambiguity‖ in their public communications—an 
ambiguity made possible by a variety of static, yet inconsistent, standards 
regarding the collection, auditing, and dissemination of information 
concerning CSR practices. In a slight modification of the classic dilemma, 
the cooperative postures are for corporations to embrace and report 
accurately CSR practices and for consumers and investors to purchase the 
services or stock of compliant companies. In contrast, the defective 
postures are for corporations not to embrace and to report inaccurately 
compliance with CSR preferences and for consumers and investors not to 
purchase the services or stock of those non-compliant companies. 
Assuming consumers and investors are willing to offer greater rewards to 
compliant companies than the cost to those businesses of adopting desired 
CSR practices, the cooperative position represents true economic gain. 
Moreover, because corporations, consumers, and investors represent repeat 
players who could punish defection in continual iterations of the game 
over time, the equilibrium position should be mutual cooperation or 
embracing CSR practices.  
But absent trustworthy auditing processes, enforcement mechanisms, 
or robust disclosure requirements that ensure full transparency, it becomes 
difficult for consumers and investors to detect when a company in fact 
adopts a defective posture. What results is true economic waste—a 
destruction of the market for good CSR practices, because consumers and 
investors will not be willing to pay a premium for CSR practices, unless 
they can rely on the accuracy of a corporation‘s statements.  
As a general matter, looking to the philosophy of trust for guidance on 
how to correct this disclosure dilemma should not seem terribly odd. After 
all, the fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe to the corporation 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/3
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represent essential trust relationships. Although the fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty provide the backbone of modern corporate law, they remain 
frustratingly amorphous as currently applied by courts. Many assert that 
reliance on abstract concepts of fiduciary duties results in a system of 
inconsistent and indeterminate regulation of corporate behavior. 
According to critics, that fiduciary duties of care and loyalty exist says 
precious little about the particular contexts in which those duties 
necessarily arise or the content of the duties in any circumstance. 
Reshaping those currently indeterminate fiduciary duties around the 
concept of encapsulated trust, however, could promote a kind of ―best 
practices‖ regarding corporate communications on CSR issues. But what 
is encapsulated trust? In simple terms, encapsulated trust constitutes a 
rational expectation that others will take our interests into account when 
determining what course of action to pursue. Considered in that light, 
maintaining encapsulated trust requires an ongoing discourse within the 
trust relationship to determine competently the interests at stake and to 
assess the best means though which others encapsulate those interests in 
pursuing a particular course of action. Applied in the context of corporate 
disclosures on CSR, encapsulated trust would require that directors and 
officers take into account the interests of shareholders of the corporation in 
determining the substance and form of corporate communication. 
Satisfying a duty based on encapsulated trust would require engaging 
those corporate constituencies in an ongoing dialogue about the preferred 
level of corporate communication and the form for reporting information. 
So with that basic understanding, how would courts apply encapsulated 
trust in the context of a fiduciary duty of disclosure? Arguably, if 
challenged, directors and officers would need to demonstrate that in 
making a particular disclosure, they competently took into account the 
interests of shareholders regarding the substance and form of the 
disclosure. If a disgruntled shareholder argued that the officers and 
directors violated their duty of care by failing to disclose effectively 
important information about CSR practices, company actors would need to 
demonstrate only that the disclosure took into account the interests of 
shareholders following an ongoing dialogue about the content, form, and 
timing of disclosures on such matters. In essence, the duty is a process-
based standard that relies on enhanced discourse to improve the integrity 
of decisions on corporate disclosures. Although perhaps rather modest in 
scope, that emphasis on improved discourse between the corporations and 
their constituencies should provide substantial improvements over the 
current disclosure regime.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Perhaps most important, encapsulated trust promotes ―best practices‖ 
in corporate disclosures by encouraging an efficient level of corporate 
communication. Efficient corporate communication represents the level of 
disclosure that corporate managers, shareholders, consumers, and other 
stakeholders would hypothetically negotiate in a world of perfect 
information and without the burdens of transaction costs in bargaining. 
The precise outcome of that hypothetical negotiation would necessarily 
change as the preferences of any party evolve.  
Without doubt, fiduciary duties based on encapsulated trust would 
impose a more stringent duty of care on officers and directors, at least with 
respect to the process of attending to those duties. Some might charge that 
the inherent flexibility in the common law duties would produce a lack of 
clarity and predictability, resulting in significantly increased litigation 
costs. Those costs, however, do not necessarily impede moving toward an 
efficient level of corporate communication. Instead, those costs actually 
facilitate a Pareto improvement over a statutory disclosure regime by 
encouraging corporations to pay continual attention to the evolving 
preferences for disclosure of CSR practices.  
Although adhering to existing static statutory disclosure standards 
would promote predictability, the very immovability of those standards 
could not accommodate changing market preferences regarding the desired 
content of corporate communication. Thus, determining whether a 
malleable fiduciary duty approach or a much more static statutory 
framework would enhance the likelihood of an efficient level of disclosure 
depends on an assessment of the nature of market preferences. If those 
preferences remain static, enduring the costs of a malleable approach 
would seem wholly unnecessary. On the other hand, if market preferences 
regarding the substance and character of corporate communication evolve, 
only a malleable common law approach could attend adequately to those 
changing preferences. 
Considering the celerity with which observed CSR practices and 
preferences change, a malleable fiduciary duty of disclosure seems to 
facilitate a Pareto improvement over continued adherence to static 
disclosure duties. Corporations will continually be obligated to reflect on 
the quantitative and qualitative sufficiency of their public disclosures. 
Rather than providing a one-size-fits-all disclosure standard for every 
corporation, a fiduciary disclosure duty based on encapsulated trust 
requires a rather disciplined organizational introspection. What marks 
sufficient disclosure for any corporation will depend on the dialogue 
between the corporation and its constituencies regarding the substance of 
corporate disclosures, as well as the manner of those disclosures.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/3
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The point is not that corporations must heed every shareholder 
preference regarding information disclosure. Rather, by instantiating 
encapsulated trust in a disclosure duty, corporations will continually refine 
as a matter of course their own understanding of what marks appropriate 
disclosure practices. To be sure, the threat of litigation from disgruntled 
shareholders provides the incentive to engage in the reflective process. But 
as that practice takes hold and shareholders become a regular part of the 
dialogue regarding corporate disclosure practices, the instances of 
litigation should wane. For by engaging and taking seriously the discourse, 
the corporations fulfill their duty based on encapsulated trust and thereby 
insulate themselves from liability.  
By promoting a process of discourse between the corporation and its 
shareholders, then, an encapsulated interest account of trust promotes best 
practices in corporate disclosures regarding CSR. While steadfast reliance 
on static disclosure standards would undermine efficiency despite 
providing predictability, a common law duty of disclosure based on 
encapsulated trust would provide flexible standards for corporate 
communication that evolve as market preferences change. In the end, not 
only could encapsulated trust provide a means to escape the current 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma that threatens the viability of the market for CSR, but 
the focus on greater discourse within the corporate setting could lead to 
enhanced ethical practices by corporate actors and their counsel.  
To examine the usefulness of encapsulated trust for regulating 
corporate disclosure obligations, Part II describes the tragedy of 
transparency that plagues current corporate communication. In particular, 
after detailing the allure of CSR to consumers, investors, and corporations, 
the Article surveys the systemic information failures that threaten the basic 
viability of CSR. Moving from tragedy to a potential solution, Part III 
attempts to rehabilitate trust as a useful organizing concept in corporate 
law. After assessing how well an encapsulated interest account of trust 
might fit within the existing fiduciary duty framework governing corporate 
actors, Part III details the various characteristics of encapsulated trust 
relevant to crafting a more analytically rigorous fiduciary duty of 
disclosure. Part IV then examines the repercussions of embracing 
encapsulated trust as a foundation of corporate disclosure duties and pays 
particular attention to effects on corporate efficiency, stakeholder 
engagement, and business ethics. The Article concludes in Part V that an 
encapsulated interest account of trust could preserve the viability of CSR 
by diminishing the gap between manager and shareholder incentives. 
Moreover, embracing encapsulated trust would cause corporations to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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engage in a richer dialogue with various corporate constituencies and 
promote a more ethical business and legal environment. 
II. THE TRAGEDY OF TRANSPARENCY 
A growing tragedy of transparency threatens the viability of CSR.
5
 The 
tragedy results from a confluence of factors that create incentives for 
corporations to dissemble, or to embrace a kind of strategic ambiguity
6
 in 
their public communications. What makes the situation tragic is not just 
some moral disapprobation regarding the lack of integrity in corporate 
communication. While solid normative grounds certainly exist upon which 
to defend transparency as an end in itself,
7
 the prospect of significant 
economic waste compounds any normative concerns. In fact, the tragedy 
becomes most apparent when examined through the lens of efficiency. To 
the extent consumer preferences for CSR and socially responsible 
investing provide compliant companies opportunities for economic gain 
(e.g., by enjoying higher consumer prices, stock premiums, or cheaper 
access to capital), an opportunity for wealth creation exists that satisfies 
the preferences of consumers, investors, and corporate shareholders alike. 
That classic win-win opportunity quickly devolves into economic waste if 
investors and consumers stop rewarding companies for engaging in 
socially responsible behavior because the market simply cannot trust the 
authenticity of purportedly responsible corporate practices or the veracity 
of corporate communications. Absent some correction to the existing legal 
and regulatory framework, the tragedy of transparency may ultimately 
cause the demise of CSR.
8
 Understanding more fully how the tragedy 
transpires represents the initial step in the investigation. 
 
 
 5. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 6. The term ―strategic ambiguity‖ refers to the practice of corporations to communicate ―in 
ways that may not be completely open‖ in order protect corporate interests. Eric M. Einsenberg & 
Marsha G. Witten, Reconsidering Openness in Organizational Communication, 12 ACAD. OF MGMT. 
REV. 418, 418 (1987); see also Eric M. Eisenberg, Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational 
Communication, 51 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 227 (1984).  
 7. See James J. Brummer, Accountability and the Restraint of Freedom: A Deontological Case 
for the Stricter Standard of Corporate Disclosure, 5 J. BUS. ETHICS 155 (1986) (discussing the Kantian 
notion that corporate transparency remains an end in itself). 
 8. This current situation differs from other areas of complex regulation where a lack of 
transparency prevents meaningful regulation at the outset. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, What Do We 
Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate Solution?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 967 (2008) (addressing lack of transparency in the antitrust context). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/3
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A. The Allure of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Social responsibility occupies an increasing and prominent concern in 
corporate life. But why do companies embrace CSR at the outset? Quite 
simply, CSR remains inextricably tethered to consumer and investor 
preferences.
9
 To the extent investors and consumers reveal a preference 
for purchasing stock or products of companies that adopt certain practices, 
companies may face an incentive to embrace those preferences.
10
 That a 
strong connection exists between consumer choice and corporate behavior 
should come as no surprise. Efforts to encourage CSR have roots many 
centuries old.
11
 The modern socially responsible investing (SRI) 
movement, however, arose in the aftermath of the social and political 
foment of the 1960s.
12
 Since that time, and with increasing frequency, 
consumers and investors have screened corporate activities for positive 
compliance with desired practices, such as engaging in fair-trade policies 
with suppliers, or for avoidance of disfavored activities, such as 
deforestation.
13
 According to one recent consumer survey, more than two-
thirds of American consumers report ―knowing that a company is 
following global standards for being socially responsible would be 
‗extremely‘ or ‗very‘ influential in their decisions to purchase a particular 
product or service‖ from that company.14 
What began as a movement based on individual consumer preferences 
now counts among its ranks large institutional investors and money 
managers. As more money gets invested based on various social screening 
criteria, the influence of SRI inevitably grows.
15
 In June 2008, the United 
 
 
 9. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional 
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 623–24 (2006). 
 10. For a full discussion of the rise of SRI and shareholder advocacy, along with a description of 
corporate responses to those activities, see id. at 623–26. 
 11. SOC. INV. FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (2006), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/research/Trends/2005%20 
Trends%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 2005 SIF REPORT]. 
 12. Id. at 3–4. 
 13. See id. at 2–3; see also Brand New Day, ECONOMIST, June 19, 1993, at 70–71 (describing the 
upcoming ―era of corporate image, in which consumers will increasingly make purchases on the basis 
of a firm‘s whole role in society: how it treats employees, shareholders and local neighbourhoods.‖); 
Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin, The Company and the Product: Corporate Associations and 
Consumer Product Responses, 61 J. MKTG. 68 (1997); Sankar Sen & C.B. Bhattacharya, Does Doing 
Good Always Lead to Doing Better? Consumer Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 J. 
MARKET RES. 225 (2001).  
 14. FLEISHMAN HILLARD & NAT‘L CONSUMERS LEAGUE, RETHINKING CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, FLEISHMAN-HILLARD/NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE STUDY 38 (2007). 
 15. Press Release, Social Investment Forum, Trends Report (Jan. 24, 2006), http://www.social 
invest.org/news/releases/pressrelease.cfm?id=61 (quoting Tim Smith) (―Over the past decade, SRI has 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Nations reported that owners and managers of worldwide assets valued at 
more than $14 trillion had signed the U.N. Principles for Responsible 
Investment, an international compact whereby signatories pledge to screen 
investments based on certain environmental, social, and governance 
issues.
16
 Within the United States, approximately ―one out of every nine 
dollars under professional management in the United States today is 
involved in socially responsible investing‖ for a total aggregate value in 
excess of $2.7 trillion.
17
 That $2.7 trillion value reflects an increase of 
324% from 1995 and represents over 18% greater growth than assets 
under professional management not screened based on social criteria from 
2005 to 2007.
18
 Moreover, between 2005 and 2007, there has been a 28% 
increase in institutional investor assets screened on social and 
environmental criteria and a 32% increase in funds dedicated to 
community investing projects.
19
  
Complementing the rapidly growing aggregate value of assets screened 
on CSR criteria, shareholder advocates seem to enjoy increasing success in 
pursuing socially responsible initiatives. In recent years, the number of 
shareholder proposals on proxy ballots related to CSR concerns has grown 
markedly.
20
 Moreover, between 2005 and 2007, overall voting support on 
shareholder sponsored environmental and social initiatives increased by 
57%.
21
 With respect to large institutional investors that filed resolutions on 
social or environmental issues, assets under their control reached $703 
billion.
22
 Although some question the efficacy of direct shareholder 
involvement in managing company affairs,
23
 others assert that shareholder 
 
 
become a major force in the U.S. financial marketplace.‖) [hereinafter 2006 Trends Report]. 
 16. Press Release, United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, Principles for 
Responsible Investment: Signatories Double in One Year; Institutional Investors ―Taking 
Implementation to the Next Level.‖ (June 17, 2008), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAnd 
Events/news_archives/2008_06_17a.html. 
 17. SOC. INV. FORUM, 2007 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES ii (2007), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/SRI_Trends_ExecSummary_ 
2007.pdf [hereinafter 2007 SIF REPORT]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at iii–iv. 
 20. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe For Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 
53, 89 (2008). 
 21. 2006 Trends Report, supra note 15. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 
733, 741 n.27 (2007) (―most studies found no correlation between increased shareholder activism and 
long-term share value, many have found that ‗the long-run average stock return [of companies targeted 
by activists] is negative and in some cases statistically significant‘‖) (citations omitted). But see 
Fairfax, supra note 20, at 89 (―This evidence reveals that shareholders‘ increased activism and power 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/3
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advocates continue to play ―a major role in improving corporate behavior 
through resolutions, letter writing, and negotiations with management on 
issues ranging from environmental risk and workplace standards to 
diversity, human rights violations, and a myriad of corporate governance 
concerns.‖24 At the very least, shareholder advocacy through the proxy 
process provides a need for corporations to address publicly a variety of 
social, ethical, political, and environmental matters relevant to the SRI 
community. 
Despite the increasing demand by consumers and investors for 
corporations to embrace CSR, a corporate decision to embrace socially 
responsible business practices may very well depend on the benefits 
corporations enjoy (or costs they avoid) through compliance. The 
willingness of investors and consumers to pay some premium in stock or 
product price for CSR practices represents one such potentially important 
benefit.
25
 Of course, that same incentive exists if consumers and investors 
effectively punish non-compliant corporations by selling stock or by 
refusing to purchase stock or products at the outset. The basic point 
remains that without some identifiable incentive for corporations to 
embrace CSR, the costs of compliance might simply outweigh potential 
benefits and cause corporations to ignore calls for changing business 
practices.
26
  
The existence of any stock premium, increased product price, or other 
potential benefits conferred by embracing CSR remains a source of 
continuing debate. Some argue that typically flat demand curves for 
corporate stock make it highly unlikely SRI screening activities will have 
more than a negligible effect on corporate policies.
27
 Contrary evidence 
suggests that real monetary incentives exist for corporations to embrace 
 
 
have not had a negative impact on stakeholder issues. Instead, such concerns appear to have benefited 
from increased shareholder activism.‖). 
 24. 2005 SIF REPORT, supra note 11, at 21. 
 25. See Siebecker, supra note 9, at 624. 
 26. Many academics and market professionals suggest that companies should embrace CSR 
practices because they promote long-term shareholder value, regardless of any premium for stock or 
product price a compliant company might garner. See, e.g., GEORGE POHLE & JEFF HITTNER, IBM 
GLOBAL BUS. SERVS., ATTAINING SUSTAINABLE GROWTH THROUGH CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2008), available at http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/index.wss/ibvstudy/gbs/ 
a1029293 [hereinafter POHLE & HITTNER]; Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Business, Human Rights, & the 
Environment: The Role of the Lawyer in CSR & Ethical Globalization, 26 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 479, 
485 (2008). 
 27. See Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting 
Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681 (2002) (―[T]he cost of 
screening in a well-diversified portfolio is probably very small and that screening is likely to have, at 
most, a tiny direct effect on targeted firms‘ actions.‖). 
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CSR. Some studies indicate socially screened mutual funds outperform 
non-screened funds
28
 and that companies embracing CSR enjoy greater 
long-term growth with less share volatility.
29
 As anecdotal evidence, some 
CSR advocates cite the consistently strong performance of the Domini 400 
Social Index, a bellwether CSR fund.
30
 Over an 18-year period, the 
Domini 400 Social Index outperformed the S&P 500 Index, which 
measures the performance of 500 major companies in the United States 
across diverse industry groups.
31
 With respect to the willingness of 
consumers to pay a premium for CSR products, at least one rather 
informal comparison of commodity prices with their free-trade 
counterparts concludes that consumers demonstrate a willingness to pay as 
much as 10% more for socially responsible products.
32
  
Although the integrity of assessing the incentives for embracing CSR 
would benefit from more robust empirical studies, the actual behavior of 
corporations may provide some of the most probative insights into the 
existence of potential gains through embracing socially responsible 
business practices. A 2008 survey of international business leaders 
surveyed by IBM indicates that 68% of those surveyed focus on CSR 
activities to generate new revenue and that 54% believe current CSR 
initiatives give their company an advantage over competitors.
33
 To the 
extent corporations accurately report those benefits, real incentives exist 
for them to embrace socially responsible business practices. 
 
 
 28. See Meir Statman, Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 56 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30 (Oct. 2000). 
 29. See Aaron A. Dhir, Recent Development of Takeovers, Foreign Investment and Human 
Rights: Unpacking the Noranda-Minmetals Conundrum, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 77, 94 (2006):  
Studies have certainly identified a positive relationship between socially responsible 
corporate behaviour and financial success, in particular with respect to share value. For 
example, businesses with ethically sound environmental policies enjoy less share value 
volatility than those without and organizations ―with a serious commitment to ethical 
behavior outperform those without such a commitment over the long term.‖  
Id. (citations omitted); see also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1284–86 (1999). 
 30. KLD Research Analytics, Inc., Domini 400 Social Index Performance, http://www.kld.com/ 
indexes/ds400index/performance.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).  
 31. For a description of the S&P 500 Index, see Standard and Poor‘s S&P 500 Fact Sheet, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SP_500_Factsheet.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009). 
 32. Posting of Jerry Lao to Sproutly, http://www.sproutly.com/2008/05/08/value-of-social-
responsibility-in-the-us-530-billion (May 8, 2008). 
 33. POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 3.  
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B. The Campaign of Corporate Images 
As SRI continues to flourish, corporations respond in kind to public 
concerns about socially responsible business practices. In 2008, 86% of 
companies in the S&P 100 Index included information about social and 
environmental business practices on their websites.
34
 Moreover, 49% of 
those same companies issued special ―sustainability reports‖ upon which 
investors and consumers in the SRI community rely.
35
 Because companies 
may face market backlash when negative reports surface regarding 
unsavory social, labor, or environmental practices,
36
 many corporations 
now work together with SRI funds and shareholder advocacy groups to 
build into their business plans specific policies responsive to the SRI 
community.
37
  
Regardless of whether or not corporations actually embrace a 
cooperative posture in striving to achieve the goals of the SRI community, 
it seems all too clear that corporations increasingly heed the market‘s 
demand for disclosures regarding business practices and operations 
relevant to SRI.
38
 As a recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers study indicated, 
many large U.S. companies consider their stance on labor, environmental, 
and social practices to be ―the next competitive battlefield.‖39 Engaging on 
 
 
 34. Press Release, Social Investment Forum, Sustainability Reporting by S&P 100 Companies 
Made Major Advances From 2005–2007 (July 17, 2008), http://www.socialinvest.org/news/releases/ 
pressrelease.cfm?id=112.  
 35. Id.; see also Michelle Berhart & Alyson Slater, How Sustainable is Your Business?, COMM. 
WORLD, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 1. 
 36. For example, Domini Investments, a bellwether SRI fund, dropped Wal-Mart from its 
socially responsible index fund, the Domini 400, based on reports about poor labor and human rights 
conditions involving its overseas suppliers. See Ellen Braunstein, Hot Topic: From Sweatshops To 
Shopping Malls, RETAIL TRAFFIC, Sept. 1, 2001, available at http://retailtrafficmag.com/mag/retail_ 
hot_topic_sweatshops/ (describing Domini‘s decision based on a ―report from the National Labor 
Committee that Wal-Mart goods were made by nearly enslaved workers under armed guard in 
Honduras and China. Wal-Mart‘s ‗Kathie Lee‘ goods were made by 13-year-olds in Honduras, forced 
to work 13 hours a day, the report states.‖). 
 37. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 493, 528–29 (2005); Matthew 
Hirschland, Whose Responsibility? CSR, Business and Public Policy: Why Going It Alone Is Not an 
Option, LEADING PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2006, at 1, available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/leading-
perspectives/2006/2006_Winter.pdf; see also Stacey Smith, Navigating the Stakeholder Relations 
Continuum, LEADING PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2004, at 6, available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/leading-
perspectives/2004/Fall.pdf; POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 3. 
 38. For a detailed discussion of the link between social investment and corporate accountability, 
see Williams, supra note 29, at 1293–1306. 
 39. Clinton Wilder, The Next Competitive Battlefield—The Sustainability Movement‟s „Triple 
Bottom Line‟ Requires IT Execs To Deliver Better Data, OPTIMIZE, Aug. 1, 2002, at 76 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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the battlefield requires corporations to speak on a variety of social, 
political, ethical, and environmental matters.  
The drive to speak about CSR practices in order to capture a 
competitive advantage in the marketplace has sparked some massive 
media campaigns. Multinational corporations like British Petroleum, 
General Electric, and Wal-Mart, to name only a few, have invested huge 
sums to communicate an image of CSR to consumers and investors.
40
 The 
allure of CSR, then, results in greater public calls for corporate disclosures 
and corporations‘ concomitant drive to project images of social 
responsibility that secure the greatest market advantage.  
C. Corporate Communication Failures 
Systemic failures regarding the compilation, auditing, communication, 
and processing of information lead to a tragedy of transparency that 
threatens the basic viability of CSR. Because ―the effectiveness of the 
CSR model pivots on information,‖41 without a reliable means to assess 
accurately corporate communications regarding their business practices, 
consumers and investors may be stripped of a means to encourage socially 
responsible business practices. Perhaps somewhat oddly, it is not simply 
the lack of information that causes the tragedy. Instead, it can also be high 
volume and low quality of information that puts CSR at risk. Thus, fueling 
the tragedy of transparency is a group of connected information failures 
that render assessing the truth or falsity of corporate communications 
increasingly difficult. 
1. Definitional Ambiguity 
A persistent definitional ambiguity regarding what constitutes CSR lies 
at the heart of the systemic information failures in corporate 
communication. Defining what CSR entails presents a rather difficult task. 
A recent IBM study describes CSR as a management practice that 
produces an overall positive impact on society through social, ethical, and 
environmental initiatives.
42
 Adopting a definition more sensitive to 
corporate profit making than IBM‘s stance, the World Bank described 
 
 
 40. Moira Herbst, Energy Efficiency: A Passing Fad?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 11, 2008, at 2, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2008/db20080310_387188.htm. 
 41. LYUBA ZARSKY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 48 (2002). 
 42. See POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 1 (―Corporate Social Responsibility is the way 
companies manage their businesses to produce an overall positive impact on society through 
economic, environmental and social actions.‖). 
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CSR as a ―commitment of businesses to contribute to sustainable 
economic development by working with employees, their families, the 
local community and society at large to improve their lives in ways that 
are good for business and for development.‖43 Some conceptions of CSR 
target every aspect of the production process,
44
 while others focus more 
narrowly on specific human rights or environmental concerns.
45
 With the 
abounding definitions of CSR in academic and professional literature, 
pinning down exactly what constitutes CSR is, as one scholar suggests, 
―like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.‖46  
Companies that embrace CSR typically eschew the constraint of short-
term shareholder wealth maximization as the singularly appropriate 
mandate for making business decisions.
47
 But even with that common link, 
it remains wholly unclear whether CSR entails any or all of supporting 
specific charitable causes, paying living wages to overseas workers, 
embracing environmentally sound business practices, avoiding animal 
testing of products, adopting robust ethical codes for business conduct, or 
a host of other concerns.
48
 Interpreting broadly the relevant constituencies 
whose interests require consideration, managers of socially responsible 
companies often take into account not just the interest of shareholders 
concerned with maximizing short-term gain, but also the interests of long-
term holders or other corporate stakeholders, such as employees, 
consumers, suppliers, community groups, and other participants of civil 
 
 
 43. See HALINA WARD, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE OF THE WORLD BANK 
GROUP, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: TAKING 
STOCK 3 (2004).  
 44. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 38 (Andrew Crane et 
al. eds., 2008) (―‗CSR is viewed as a comprehensive set of policies, practices and programs that are 
integrated into business operations, supply chains, and decision-making processes throughout the 
company.‘‖).  
 45. See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT‘L 
L.J. 309 (2004) (suggesting that CSR properly focuses on human rights and environmental justice). 
 46. Peter Madsen, Professionals, Business Practitioners, and Prudential Justice, 39 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 835, 836 (2008); see also David Monsma, Equal Rights, Governance, and the Environment: 
Integrating Environmental Justice Principles in Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
443, 480 n.204 (2006); Antonio Vives, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and Markets 
and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 200–01 (2008) (arguing that the 
variety of extant definitions for CSR produces heated controversies about the appropriate goals of 
corporate actors); Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1647 
n.54 (2006) (―Legal academics have struggled to produce useful definitions of CSR, and in that effort 
may be well advised to look to the management literature.‖). 
 47. Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More 
Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 438, 443–44 (2007). 
 48. See, e.g., Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate 
“Conscience”, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1148–51 (2008) (discussing the various notions of what good 
corporate behavior entails in the corporate consciousness). 
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society.
49
 Which particular interests corporate managers heed depend, of 
course, on the precise notion of CSR embraced.
50
 
Although the lack of definitional precision betokens the breadth of 
activities that fall under the CSR umbrella, the ambiguity also creates 
significant disclosure challenges.
51
 Managers simply might not know what 
information demonstrates compliance with any particular concept of 
CSR.
52
 Although it might be easy to report the earnings of overseas 
employees and suppliers, those raw numbers might not fully depict 
whether the wages constitute ―living wages‖ or whether a product resulted 
from ―fair-trade‖ practices. Moreover, providing disclosure sufficient to 
satisfy one notion of CSR embraced by certain consumers and investors 
does not imply the disclosure is sufficient to satisfy other potentially 
competing notions of what social responsibility entails.
53
 
2. Incoherent Standards 
A lack of coherent standards for collecting, reporting, and auditing 
CSR data compounds the definitional problem.
54
 In some sense, the 
definitional ambiguity regarding the basic content of CSR renders the 
incoherence inevitable. Without a common sense of what needs to be 
measured, the metrics employed for data collection and reporting seem 
bound to vary. 
Efforts to enhance the uniformity of reporting social data certainly 
exist.
55
 But uniformity alone does not necessarily produce meaningful 
 
 
 49. See Siebecker, supra note 9, at 623–24; POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 4.  
 50. See Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested 
Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 635, 646–48 (2004) (discussing 
how firms embrace social responsibility depending on the particular notion of good corporate 
citizenship at stake). 
 51. See Monsma, supra note 46, at 475–81; see also infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 52. POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 9. 
 53. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 597, 639–42 (1982). 
 54. See Martin Lutz, The Lawyer‟s Role in Mitigating CSR Risk, 99 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 
267, 268 (2005):  
This lack of clarity as to CSR standards has important consequences to those of us advising 
clients on how to avoid litigation risk. Indeed, unclear legal standards, or the faulty 
application of standards, can cause the wrong sorts of incentives. In the CSR context, if the 
relevant legal standards are unclear, or are applied in an inconsistent and unpredictable way, 
then the risks attendant to any particular foreign investment will become more difficult and 
expensive to manage.. 
Id. 
 55. See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas 
Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 457, 471–92 (2004) (describing three different reporting 
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disclosure. Uniformity could come at the expense of informational 
integrity, if pandering to the least common denominator is required to gain 
universal acceptance of collection and reporting standards.
56
 So even if 
uniformity makes commensurable comparisons among corporations 
possible on some level, unless the disclosed data provides sufficient 
understanding, the comparisons are fruitless at the start.
57
 
Moreover, since the notion of what constitutes CSR varies and evolves 
as values change, a static and uniform approach to defining corporate 
disclosure obligations might not yield relevant information.
58
 If the 
definition of CSR remains essentially malleable, changing over time in 
different corporate contexts, the disclosure obligations might need to 
accommodate that flexibility. Currently, the CSR movement suffers from a 
lack of uniformity as well as a lack of meaningfully fluid standards that 
could produce sufficient transparency. 
3. Data Dumping 
Some corporations attempt to satisfy disclosure obligations through 
massive ―data dumping.‖59 Burying material facts in excessive amounts of 
information regarding corporate practices, however, impedes the ability of 
individuals, and even sophisticated institutional investors, from making 
sound judgments.
60
 In one obvious sense, information overload increases 
 
 
initiatives, including the Global Reporting Initiative, that attempt to increase uniformity in CSR 
disclosures).  
 56. See Richard A. Rinkema, Environmental Agreements, Non-State Actors, and the Kyoto 
Protocol: A “Third Way” For International Climate Action?, 24 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 729, 753 
(2003). 
 57. For a discussion of the market‘s need for accurate reporting regarding CSR practices and the 
incommensurability of current reporting methods, see David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling 
Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to 
Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 159–61 (2007). 
 58. Id. at 195–96 (suggesting that corporate managers continually review disclosure practices 
rather than relying on static disclosure standards to guide corporate communication). 
 59. See generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003). 
 60. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Becherer, 461 F.3d 365, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2006) (agreeing with a district 
court analysis that gathering too much information about stock options in a proxy statement ―would 
result in an avalanche of trivia that would serve only to confuse shareholders‖); Werner v. Werner, 267 
F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing the ―buried facts‖ doctrine as deeming a disclosure 
inadequate when the disclosure ―is presented in a way that conceals or obscures the information sought 
to be disclosed‖ and noting that the doctrine ―applies when the fact in question is hidden in a 
voluminous document or is disclosed in a piecemeal fashion [that] prevents a reasonable shareholder 
from realizing the ‗correlation and overall import of the various facts interspersed throughout‘ the 
document‖ (emphasis added) (quoting Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 
1986)); Kas, 796 F.2d at 516 (endorsing the notion that ―‗full and fair disclosure cannot be achieved 
through piecemeal release of subsidiary facts [that] if stated together might provide a sufficient 
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the cost of sifting through data to locate the relevant facts.
61
 Moreover, 
rather than expending the costly effort to wade through large amounts of 
data, individuals often adopt heuristic short-cuts that impair effective 
analysis.
62
 It is no secret to corporations that producing enormous amounts 
of information in response to consumer and investor demands can 
undermine adequate understanding. As one multi-national corporation 
recently reported, ―you can‘t call it transparency if you simply spew 
information out into the marketplace, or unleash what is effectively a data 
dump on your customers.‖63  
Why would corporations engage in a ―data dump‖ that impedes 
understanding? The securities regulation regime that governs mandatory 
reporting of public companies, as well as most state corporate laws, 
provide significant immunity from fraud liability for comprehensive 
disclosure, even if the amount of disclosure arguably renders adequate 
understanding all but impossible.
64
 Moreover, the uncertainty with respect 
to what socially responsible business practices entail may make it difficult 
to determine what information the corporation possesses and is apposite to 
consumer and investor concerns. A corporation acting in good faith might 
opt for excessive disclosure, because ―[e]ven the most open and proactive 
firms face a dilemma: Too often they just don‘t know what they know. 
 
 
statement of the ultimate fact‘‖ (quoting Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 720 (11th Cir. 1983) and 
noting that ―[t]o find a disclosure inadequate under the ‗buried facts‘ doctrine . . . there must be some 
conceivable danger that the reasonable shareholder would fail to realize the correlation and overall 
import of the various facts interspersed throughout the proxy‖); Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 
720 F. Supp. 241, 250–51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (endorsing the buried facts theory as supplying a cause of 
action for a shareholder who claims that a corporation ―buried negative information in obscure parts of 
the various reports so that potential purchasers would overlook it‖) (emphasis added); Gould v. Am. 
Haw. Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 996 (D. Del. 1971) (finding disclosures in a proxy insufficient 
because the ―various facts listed previously [that] the defendants contend adequately reveal any 
conflict are interspersed throughout the proxy materials and could be gleaned only through a close and 
prolonged perusal‖) (emphasis added); In re MONY Group, Inc. Shareholder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 24–
25 (Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that under Delaware law corporate directors must disclose all material 
information but that the law does not require disclosure of ―‗speculative information [that] would tend 
to confuse stockholders or inundate them with an overload of information‘‖) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Arnold v. Soc‘y for Sav. Bancorp., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994); see also Get Naked, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 66 (recognizing that absolute transparency in the corporate setting may 
not produce better corporations). See generally Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA 
L. REV. 885 (2006) (questioning the fundamental normative assumption that transparency in the 
government, political, or corporate contexts results in efficient and overall better systems); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 613, 618–33 (1999) (discussing the rise of informational regulation and questioning whether this 
regulation actually produces the most efficient state).  
 61. See Paredes, supra note 59, at 419. 
 62. Id.  
 63. POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 11. 
 64. See Paredes, supra note 59, at 421–30.  
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And when they do, they don‘t know what to share.‖65 Regardless of the 
motives for the dissemination, communicating vast amounts of 
information can clearly inhibit understanding. 
4. Corporate Silence 
Taking an opposite tact, many corporations simply refuse to publish 
relevant information. Although companies may indeed disclose 
information to consumers and investors, complaints abound that 
companies too often hide the data essential to making an informed 
decision about the level of social responsibility embraced.
66
 Since the 
content of social, ethical, and environmental reporting falls outside the 
ambit of most securities regulations and state disclosure laws, companies 
may be reluctant to expand disclosure in those areas. Reasons for such 
reticence ―include fear of liability and lawsuit, particularly if disclosure 
reveals breaches of law, and concerns that competitors will have access to 
proprietary information. There are also concerns that companies could use 
environmental or social performance data to undercut competitors.‖67 To 
the extent companies withhold the essential pieces of information 
necessary to make an adequate assessment of socially responsible business 
practices, consumers and investors are left foundering. 
5. Greenwashing 
Many suggest, however, than in an effort to appear socially grounded, 
corporations have engaged in ―greenwashing‖ or promoting a false (or 
factually unsupported) image of social responsibility.
68
 For instance, 
British Petroleum‘s advertised commitment to environmental safety faced 
serious accusations of greenwashing following the 2005 explosion at its 
Texas refinery and a 2006 oil spill from its Alaskan pipeline.
69
 Taking 
 
 
 65. POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 9. 
 66. See Williams, supra note 29, at 1291–92; see also James Farrar, On Sustainability: HP CSR 
Report: A Triumph for Transparency, ZDNET, Apr. 16, 2008, http://blogs.zdnet.com/sustainability/ 
?p=123 (After praising Hewlett-Packard for disclosing negative information about its suppliers, noting 
―[t]he apparel industry tried to resist this for some time on the grounds that opacity of the supply chain 
was a key competitive advantage.‖). 
 67. ZARSKY, supra note 41, at 48. 
 68. William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 
253, 253–60 (2003); Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Under Threat of Audit, Mar. 24, 2006, http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/Lyon_ 
Maxwell_Greenwash_March_2006.pdf.  
 69. Curtis V. Verschoor, Is BP an Acronym for “Big Polluter”?, STRATEGIC FIN., Sept. 2007, at 
12. 
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another example, Greenpeace recently accused Hewlett-Packard of falsely 
claiming environmental credentials after failing to remove toxic chemicals 
from its production line.
70
  
As SRI continues to grow, accusations of corporate greenwashing 
become more troublesome as well.
71
 To the extent greenwashing persists, 
consumers and investors cannot effectively discern which companies 
actually embrace CSR. As a result, some companies that falsely, yet 
effectively, promote an image of CSR will enjoy undeserved benefits, 
while companies that honestly report CSR practices will find it more 
difficult (and arguably costly) to establish the authenticity of their socially 
responsible business practices.  
Exacerbating the problem of greenwashing are corporate claims of 
free-speech rights.
72
 With increasing vigor, corporations are mixing 
political commentary with otherwise commercial disclosures in an effort 
to render the amalgam of politically tinged commercial speech immune 
from liability or regulation under the First Amendment.
73
 Because 
statements regarding CSR practices often touch inherently political 
matters, to the extent corporations successfully press their political speech 
claims, it becomes even more difficult to test the accuracy of corporate 
communications.
74
  
6. Dilemmas and Tragedies 
Two economic heuristic devices, the Prisoner‘s Dilemma and the 
Tragedy of the Commons, help clarify the transparency crisis that 
threatens the viability of CSR. In the first instance, consumers, investors, 
and corporations find themselves locked in a slight variation of a classic 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma.75 In the classic case, prisoners awaiting trial may 
cooperate with each other by remaining silent about the crime committed 
 
 
 70. Greenpeace Accuses HP of Greenwash, ZDNET.CO.UK., Feb. 19, 2007, http://news.zdnet. 
co.uk/hardware/0,1000000091,39237334,00.htm. 
 71. See David Kozlowski, Greenwash Getting Harder to Clean Up, BLDG. OPERATING MGMT., 
Mar. 2002, available at http://www.facilitiesnet.com/green/article.asp?id=1386. 
 72. See Michael R. Siebecker, Building a “New Institutional” Approach to the First Amendment, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 247, 250–54 (2008). 
 73. See id.; see also Siebecker, supra note 9, at 621–26. 
 74. For a detailed discussion of the effect that granting full First Amendment protection to 
politically tinged corporate speech would have on the mandatory period reporting and disclosure 
requirements under the securities laws, see Siebecker, supra note 9, at 651–70. 
 75. For an interesting description of the Prisoner‘s Dilemma applied to CSR, see Note, Finding 
Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic View, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1959–66 
(2004). See generally W. POUNDSTONE, PRISONER‘S DILEMMA (1992) (providing a detailed 
description of the history and theoretical implications of the Prisoner‘s Dilemma). 
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or defect by testifying for the prosecution against the fellow accomplice. If 
one prisoner testifies and the other remains silent, the defecting prisoner 
receives no sentence and the prisoner who chose to remain silent receives 
a ten-year prison term. If both cooperate by remaining silent, each receives 
a short six-month jail term. If both defect by testifying against the other, 
however, each receives a five-year prison sentence.
76
 Although the 
prisoners would be better served by cooperating rather than defecting 
given the relative payoffs, mutual defection represents the equilibrium 
position in a one time iteration of the game.
77
 That result occurs, because 
for each player in the single game, defection likely provides greater 
rewards than cooperation. Studies demonstrate that if the game is played 
repeatedly, however, the ability to punish defecting behavior from one 
game to the next causes the equilibrium position to shift to mutual 
cooperation.
78
  
In a slightly modified version of the Dilemma relevant to the tragedy of 
transparency, the cooperative postures entail corporations embracing, and 
reporting accurately, socially responsible business practices with 
consumers and investors purchasing the products or stock of compliant 
companies. In contrast, the defective postures entail corporations not 
embracing, and not reporting accurately, socially responsible business 
practices and consumers and investors not purchasing the products or 
stock of socially compliant companies.  
Because corporations, consumers, and investors represent repeat 
players in continual iterations of the game over time (i.e., with each report 
of social compliance and every purchase of company products or stock), 
the equilibrium position should be mutual cooperation. But due to the 
various corporate communication failures described above, it is extremely 
difficult for consumers and investors to detect when a corporation adopts a 
defective posture. In essence, corporations can falsely report compliance 
with CSR standards without actually embracing those practices. So, rather 
than providing accurate and accessible information, corporations find an 
incentive to dissemble, thereby defecting from the cooperative equilibrium 
position that would produce authentic CSR and provide rewards to 
compliant companies. Of course, corporations do not enjoy complete 
immunity from detection. But if consumers and investors feel they are 
 
 
 76. See POUNDSTONE, supra note 75. 
 77. S. Le & R. Boyd, Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner‟s Dilemma, 
245 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 258–67 (2007). 
 78. Id. 
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playing a rigged game, they too may refuse to cooperate. As a result, the 
mutual economic gains from CSR risk getting wasted. 
In a second sense, current corporate communications regarding CSR 
practices resemble a reverse Tragedy of the Commons.
79
 In a classic 
commons tragedy, public goods get over-consumed and eventually 
disappear because individuals fail to internalize fully the costs of 
consumption.
80
 In the CSR context, the quality public information that 
would enable an effective CSR movement to thrive does not get over-
consumed but instead gets lost in a vast over-contribution of information. 
Relevant and accessible data gets lost like a needle in a haystack. As a 
result, the public good of quality information gets destroyed.  
Thus, the tragedy of transparency threatens the basic viability of CSR. 
Clearly, consumers, investors, and corporations alike have economic 
interests in sustaining the CSR movement. From the perspective of 
corporations, the increased (and, thus, less expensive) access to capital 
coupled with an ability to command higher product prices provide 
incentives for social responsibility. From the viewpoint of consumers and 
investors, the change in corporate practices provides greater utility than 
the increased stock or product price premium they would pay for corporate 
social compliance. Despite the mutual economic advantages of CSR, 
without more robust corporate transparency, the sustainability of the 
movement seems questionable.  
III. ENCAPSULATED TRUST AND CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY 
Given the systemic information failures that persist under the current 
federal and state regulatory regimes, can a concept of trust provide a 
useful framework for determining the disclosure obligations of 
corporations? Looking to that philosophical foundation should not seem 
terribly strange, considering the notion of trust lies at the core of corporate 
law.
81 
After all, the basic fiduciary duties of care and loyalty place 
directors, officers, and certain controlling shareholders in a special 
relationship of trust with the corporation.
82
 Operating through those 
 
 
 79. For a general review of various aspects of the classical Tragedy of the Commons, see Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 80. Id. at 1246. 
 81. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
185–218 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Eli Bukspan, The Notion of Trust as a Comprehensive 
Theory of Contract and Corporate Law: A New Approach to the Conception That the Corporation is a 
Nexus of Contract, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 229 (2006). 
 82. See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. 
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fiduciary duties, a bedrock sense of trust ensures all shareholders of a 
corporation, and perhaps other corporate constituencies, will have their 
interests taken into account by corporate decision makers.
83
 Widely 
embraced in the common law and codified in most states,
84
 the reach of 
that fundamental trust relationship continues to grow as courts and 
legislatures find new corporate contexts in which to extend those basic 
fiduciary duties. Whether regarding corporate philanthropy, shareholder 
disputes, director malfeasance, hostile takeovers, insider trading, CSR, or 
complex acquisition transactions, the notion of trust provides important 
guidance and limitations on a vast array of corporate actions.
85
  
Although providing the backbone of modern corporate law,
86
 the 
concept of trust might not seem particularly apposite when applied to 
issues of disclosure.
87
 While maintaining a robust corporate enterprise may 
require a strong sense of trust to balance the rights and responsibilities of 
competing corporate actors and constituencies,
88
 does trust really play 
such an essential (or even relevant) role in the context of corporate 
communications? Even if there were some nexus between disclosure and 
the philosophically disciplined account of encapsulated trust considered 
here,
89
 that special account of encapsulated trust may differ fundamentally 
 
 
REV. 75, 98–120 (2005).  
 83. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 188–93; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1781–
1807 (2001). 
 84. See Lyman Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers 
(and Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147, 148 (2007) (stating that thirty-four states have codified 
officer fiduciary duties with the remaining states embracing those duties in common law doctrine); 
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 1573, 1593–94 (2005) (describing the common law and statutory evolution of corporate 
fiduciary duties under state law). 
 85. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 595 (1992). 
 86. See Mitchell, supra note 81, at 185–218; Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 
1461 (2005) (discussing the essential role of trust in economic transactions); R. William Ide III & 
Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution for an Age of 
Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1115–16 (2003) (describing the 
essential role public trust plays in corporate life). 
 87. See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly From Investors: What Disclosure 
Does Rule 10b-5 Require, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 121–22 (2003) (positing that reliance upon fiduciary 
trust duties creates intractable questions and disturbing outcomes for corporate disclosure in the 
context of securities sales); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and 
Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473 (2007) (criticizing the existing regulatory framework 
for corporate disclosure for positing a theory of corporate communication obligations based on 
behavioral economic theory).  
 88. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary 
Law‟s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 520–21 (2000). 
 89. See infra Part III.A–B. 
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from what currently undergirds corporate fiduciary duties. Therefore, 
answering whether a sense of trust can provide a useful framework for 
determining corporate disclosure obligations must begin by understanding 
how existing corporate fiduciary duties of trust relate to disclosure, if at 
all.  
Examining that tie between disclosure and trust seems an especially 
important task, considering much of current corporate disclosure 
obligations (at least for public corporations) are mandated by federal 
securities laws and regulations.
90
 That statutory backdrop may very well 
carve out disclosure obligations from the role trust plays in regulating 
corporate conduct or obligations. If that investigation reveals, however, 
that the extant fiduciary duties of officers and directors include—or are at 
least amenable to accommodating—duties of disclosure, then determining 
how a more robust and disciplined philosophical account of trust might 
inform the scope of that fiduciary duty of disclosure becomes quite useful. 
In the end, applying a concept of encapsulated trust to the fiduciary duties 
owed by directors and officers would arguably provide a means to escape 
the tragedy of transparency looming on the horizon.  
A. The Fiduciary Framework for Disclosure 
That directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to 
the corporations they serve represents an uncontroversial proposition.
91
 
Memorialized in the state statutes that sanction the very existence of the 
corporate form and pepper the common law of business organizations in 
each jurisdiction,
92
 those two fiduciary duties provide the basic safeguard 
to shareholders and other constituencies against unbridled opportunism 
and misconduct by those corporate managers.
93
  
By design, the duties sustain and define an essential agency 
relationship that intends to prevent the actions of directors and officers 
 
 
 90. See Siebecker, supra note 9, at 651–71; Paredes, supra note 59, at 421–30. 
 91. Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 86–105 (2005) (describing the evolution of corporate fiduciary duties from 
ancient times). See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers 
are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource 
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002). 
 92. See Justice Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 
333, 333 (2002); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 93. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS 
FROM ENRON TO REFORM 246–310 (2006); Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties 
and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 76–80 (2005) (discussing the evolution and basic role 
of fiduciary duties under corporate law). 
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from falling too far afield from the interests of those they serve.
94
 The 
duties capture a sense of obligation, or a set of incentives, that dissuade 
corporate decision makers from shirking their responsibilities or pursuing 
personal goals at odds with the corporation.
95
  
At the core of that agency relationship lies an essential concept of trust. 
After all, the very nature of a fiduciary relationship connotes a reliance on 
trust.
96
 In essence, trust provides a sort of philosophical fuel that animates 
the duties and gives them an initial trajectory.
97
 Beyond providing that first 
burst of definitional momentum, however, trust arguably plays a limited 
role in shaping the precise contours of corporate fiduciary duties. 
Although trust may provide an essential touchstone or starting point for 
grappling with the substantive content of corporate fiduciary duties, trust 
as currently construed in corporate law seems quite vague.
98
 So even if 
trust represents the philosophical atom from which the force of corporate 
fiduciary duties emanates, the nature of that philosophical atom remains a 
bit of a mystery.
99
  
Perhaps because the bedrock principle of trust remains rather 
amorphous as currently construed in corporate law, the precise shape of 
the fiduciary duties directors and officers owe remains a topic of 
significant contention.
100
 Many assert that reliance on abstract concepts of 
 
 
 94. See Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and 
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV., 1619, 1626–27 (2001).  
 95. Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 625, 646 (2004) (―To deter management malfeasance and to provide shareholders a remedy 
for managerial shirking or stealing, the law imposes on managers, as agents of the corporation, the 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.‖); Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the 
Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 265, 270–78 (1998); see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939) (―[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence 
to further their private interests. . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the 
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.‖). 
 96. Richard N. Ottaway, Defining Trust in Fiduciary Responsibilities, in TRUST, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND CONTROL: THE ETHICS OF ACCOUNTING & FINANCE 3 (W. Michael Hoffman et 
al. eds., 2000) (―In some ways, there is no role in fiduciary relationships other than trust.‖); Sarah 
Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard 
and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 256–65 (2006); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 614–17 (2001) (discussing the essential nexus 
between trust and fiduciary relationships). See generally Bukspan, supra note 81. 
 97. See Cross, supra note 86, at 1461 (positing in the context of economic transactions, ―[w]hile 
we have a generalized understanding of the concept of trust, it is not readily amenable to clear 
definition.‖); see also id. at 1461 n.6 (listing a host of scholarly opinions regarding the ambiguity of 
trust in corporate law). 
 98. Blair & Stout, supra note 83, at 1747–53, 1780–89 (2001) (discussing the variety of 
conceptions of trust and their application in corporate law). 
 99. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 428 
(1993) (discussing the ―mystery‖ of fiduciary duties in corporate law). 
 100. MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 610 (1995) (suggesting 
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fiduciary duties results in a system of inconsistent and incoherent 
regulation of corporate behavior. According to critics, that duties of care 
and loyalty exist says precious little about the particular contexts in which 
those duties necessarily arise or the content of the duties in any 
circumstance.
101
 For instance, when and to what extent does the duty of 
care require officers and directors to prevent unlawful activities from 
taking place at a company?
102
 Would officers of a shipping company who 
knowingly permit company truck drivers to park illegally in order to make 
timely deliveries violate a duty of care? Would the fiduciary standard 
apply similarly to officers of a pharmaceutical company who knowingly 
acquiesced to salespeople providing illegal ―kickbacks‖ to physicians for 
prescribing company products? For those skeptical of the ability to use 
fiduciary duties as organizing constructs in corporate law, the criticism 
seems not that the duties of trust provide no information about appropriate 
conduct of officers and directors, but instead that those broad 
philosophical concepts provide imprecise and spare guidance.
103
 Rather 
than rely on vague fiduciary duties, opponents often suggest clear statutory 
mandates or negotiated contracts regarding the shape of those duties 
specific to each company.
104
 By allowing the market to shape fiduciary 
duties through contract, the goal remains a more efficient regulatory 
regime. 
Of course, proponents of trust and fiduciary duties meet their critics 
head on. Often using instances of corporate excess and scandal as ample 
 
 
fiduciary standards remain extremely vague in corporate law); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: 
An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1988) (describing trust based fiduciary 
duties as ―elusive concepts‖); Duggin & Goldman, supra note 96, at 263 n.334 (2006) (stating the 
courts have had difficulty defining the precise nature of corporate fiduciary relationships). 
 101. See Smith, supra note 91, at 1411–15 (discussing the indeterminacy in construing fiduciary 
duties by courts); see also Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People‟s Money, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1309, 1320 (2008) (arguing that fiduciary duty obligations seem inconsistently applied). 
 102. The example targets the basic issue of a duty to monitor corporate malfeasance raised in In re 
Caremark Int‟l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a detailed discussion of the 
case, see Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark‟s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007). 
 103. See Smith, supra note 91, at 1411–15; supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text; see also 
Stuart R. Cohn, Corporate Natural Law: The Dominance of Justice in a Codified World, 48 FLA. L. 
REV. 551, 559 (1996) (suggesting that inherent vagueness of fiduciary duties causes courts to rely on 
basic equity principles to determine breaches of care). 
 104. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 101, at 1314–15 (―Our understanding of capital 
structures is simply too primitive for us to do much more than enforce the contracts that are written as 
best we can. The default rules we devise—and fiduciary obligations are simply one of these—should 
be in service of these contracts.‖) (citations omitted); Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, 
Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors‟ Fiduciary Duties: A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 1, 14–17 nn.46–47 (2007) (discussing various alternative approaches to a standard fiduciary 
duty framework for regulating corporate actors). 
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fodder, advocates of reinvigorated fiduciary duties attempt to putty the 
cracks in the increasingly distressed moral foundations of corporate law.
105
 
Rather than emphasizing regulatory efficiency or market preferences, 
proponents of fiduciary duties cite the need for corporate integrity and 
great attention to the constituencies corporations serve.
106
 While the 
approaches remain quite diverse, some commonality cuts across the 
spectrum. For many, the failure to make trust central to corporate life 
causes, or at least permits, corporate scandals to recur.
107
 Sympathetic 
scholars, judges, and even market professionals describe the need for 
enhanced trust in corporate governance and its particular application in the 
instances considered.
108
 Rather than providing a detailed, methodological 
defense of a particular philosophy of trust that the law should embrace,
109
 
many advocates of trust focus on the effects that the absence of trust 
causes and the benefits enhanced trust would create in corporate life. The 
absence of a more basic methodological discussion does not betoken a 
fundamental flaw in the analysis. Instead, it simply further fuels the debate 
about whether trust remains too malleable to solve the corporate problems 
identified.
110
 In light of the debate about the role trust and fiduciary duties 
should play in regulating corporate conduct, the relationship between 
disclosure and existing fiduciary duties remains somewhat unclear.  
Complicating the matter further is the role that the securities regulation 
regime plays in regulating corporate disclosure obligations. Through a 
variety of statutes, rules, and regulations, the securities laws provide a 
 
 
 105. See William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law‟s 
Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 139–85 (Lawrence M. Mitchell ed., 1995); JERRY 
W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS FROM ENRON TO 
REFORM, 246–310 (2006); David M. Walker, Restoring Trust After Recent Accountability Failures, in 
GOVERNING THE CORPORATION 21–47 (Justin O‘Brien ed., 2005). 
 106. See, e.g., Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility, 54 MERCER L. REV. 789, 790–92 (2003) (reasoning that corporate responsibility 
springs, at a minimum, from the exercise of fiduciary duties, and this corporate responsibility leads to 
public trust in corporate integrity). 
 107. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 96, at 256–73. 
 108. Id. at 273–74. See generally JAY WILLIAM LORSCH, LESLIE BERLOWITZ & ANDY ZELLEKE, 
RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (2004). 
 109. While there are many proposals to address specific issues within the trust framework, see, for 
example, Lawton W. Hawkins, Exchange-Enhanced Special Litigation Committees: Enforcing 
Fiduciary Duties Amid a Crisis of Trust, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 587, 589 (2003) (―[D]erivative suits can 
play a role in restoring trust in the officers and directors of U.S. corporations‖, they focus on the tools 
to attempt to create or restore that trust and not to the nature of trust in the corporate context.). 
 110. But see Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O‘Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1717, 1779–96 (2006) (examining corporate scandals and governance under a cognitive theory of 
trust).  
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framework for mandatory, periodic disclosures by public companies.
111
 
Whether in the context of quarterly or annual reports, securities offerings, 
proxy solicitations, or a host of other public communications, the 
securities laws establish an integrated and uniform disclosure system to 
ensure consumers and investors receive reliable information, both 
quantitative and qualitative, to inform their decisions.
112
 The network of 
laws provides differing degrees of fraud liability that change depending on 
the context.
113
 Taken as a whole, those various levels of fraud protection 
attempt to strike a balance between satisfying the public‘s need for 
accurate business data and providing sufficient incentives (with reward or 
penalty) for corporations to disseminate that information.
114
  
The concern with the securities laws centers on preemption of state 
statutory or common law disclosure duties. To the extent that the vast 
disclosure duties embedded in the federal securities laws entirely preempt 
conflicting (or more strenuous) state laws, the basic relevance of any 
nexus between disclosure and corporate fiduciary duties hangs in the 
balance.
115
 Without question, the federal securities laws intend to provide 
some uniformity regarding the sale of securities.
116
 The Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (the ―Uniform Standards 
Act‖)117 preempts a variety of state law securities actions and requires 
them to be brought in federal court. The Uniform Standards Act, however, 
does not preempt exclusive derivative actions brought by shareholders on 
behalf of the corporation, including claims based on the sale of securities 
involving corporate communications regarding stockholder voting rights, 
appraisal rights, dissenting rights, or responses to tender offers.
118
 
Moreover, pursuant to the ―internal affairs‖ doctrine, the securities laws 
 
 
 111. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 
(2006). See generally Siebecker, supra note 9.  
 112. See Siebecker, supra note 9, at 641–42. 
 113. Id. at 661–62. 
 114. See Herbert S. Wander, Securities Law Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, SN071 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 797 (2008) (―The primary issue to focus on when reading these proposals is whether they 
effectively balance the goal of encouraging broader dissemination of forward looking information to 
the investing public without compromising investor protection by sanctioning fraudulent or recklessly 
prepared forecasts.‖). 
 115. See 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 57–60 (1989) (highlighting 
scholarly discussion of preemption spanning from the 1950s to the 1980s). See generally Michael A. 
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 273 (1998). 
 116. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of 
Details Concerning Directors‟ and Officers‟ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 
1190 n.139 (2006).  
 117. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (Supp. 2006). 
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generally do not preempt issues of corporate governance arising under 
state law.
119
 Despite the broad mandatory disclosure obligations detailed in 
the federal securities laws, some room exists for fiduciary disclosure 
duties based on state law. 
Delaware provides the most prominent example of a robust duty of 
disclosure based on state law fiduciary duties.
120
 Under Delaware law, the 
duties of loyalty and good faith that directors and officers owe require full 
and accurate communication with shareholders. For some time, Delaware 
has embraced a duty of full disclosure on matters requiring shareholder 
action.
121
 In Malone v. Brincat,
122
 however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
announced a much broader disclosure duty that encompasses general 
corporate communications with shareholders, even when the 
communications touch upon matters regulated by the federal securities 
laws.  
In Malone, shareholders of a publicly traded Delaware corporation 
alleged that company directors breached their state law fiduciary duty of 
disclosure by filing false financial reports with the SEC and routinely 
communicating false information to shareholders regarding the company‘s 
financial condition.
123
 Although upholding the lower court‘s dismissal of 
the complaint, the Delaware Supreme Court held that ―Delaware law also 
protects shareholders who receive false communications from directors 
even in the absence of a request for shareholder action. When the directors 
are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming 
shareholders about the business of the corporation . . . there is a violation 
of fiduciary duty.‖124 Describing the duty of disclosure as 
 
 
 119. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1997) (refusing to federalize all corporate 
law regarding transactions in securities); Mark J. Roe, Delaware‟s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
588, 597 (2003) (describing the ―internal affairs‖ doctrine that informally limits the scope of federal 
authority from extending to state governance issues).  
 120. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond Sox, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1941, 1957–58 (2007).  
 121. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (1992); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling 
Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director‟s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 
1174 n.394 (1996). 
 122. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
 123. Id. at 8.  
 124. Id. at 14; see also Jackson Nat‘l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 390 (Del. Ch. 
1999):  
It necessarily follows from Malone that when directors communicate with stockholders, they 
must recognize their duty of loyalty do so with honesty and fairness, regardless of the 
stockholders‘ status as preferred or common, and regardless of the absence of a request for 
action required pursuant to a statute, the corporation‘s certificate of incorporation or any 
bylaw provision. 
Jackson, 741 A.2d at 390. 
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―complementary‖ to federal disclosure mandates and citing the Senate 
Committee Report on the Uniform Securities Act that explicitly 
recognized the import of state law disclosure duties,
125
 the Delaware 
Supreme Court established a substantial platform for a disclosure duty 
independent of federal standards. 
Despite the broad disclosure duty articulated by the Delaware Supreme 
Court, debate persists regarding its scope, application, and usefulness as a 
means of organizing corporate behavior.
126
 The concerns expressed are 
certainly not limited to the realm of corporate disclosure duties but appear 
generally whenever common law standards play a significant role. Why? 
Although organic common law standards can necessarily adapt more 
quickly than formal legislative initiatives to evolving corporate 
practices,
127
 the very flexibility also sparks concerns about 
indeterminacy.
128
 Rather than remaining tethered to a coherent set of 
principles capable of consistent application over a range of circumstances, 
standards risk drifting from one case to the next. A concern over the 
potential arbitrariness and inconsistency in the application of common law 
fiduciary standards should arise, however, only if an insufficiently sound 
set of principles exists upon which to base those duties. To the extent a 
robust and detailed philosophical framework supports the articulation of 
common law fiduciary standards, concerns over indeterminacy should 
wane. Moreover, at least in the case of a fiduciary duty of disclosure based 
 
 
 125. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 13 n.42 (1998) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 11–12 (May 4, 
1998)) (“The Committee is keenly aware of the importance of state corporate law, specifically those 
states that have laws that establish a fiduciary duty of disclosure.‖). 
 126. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening 
the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005); Kahn, supra note 88; Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden 
Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of Delaware Corporations‟ Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2000); Jennifer O‘Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy 
Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475 (2002). 
 127. For a general discussion of the advantages of common law standards over statutory initiatives 
in responding to changing practices, see Michael R. Siebecker, Cookies and the Common Law: Are 
Internet Advertisers Trespassing on Our Computers?, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 893 (2003). 
 128. For concerns regarding deference to common law standards in corporate law, see, for 
example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering 
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 601–02 (2002); Douglas M. Branson, 
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. 
REV. 85 (1990); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate 
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997). 
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on encapsulated trust, the flexibility of the common law duties necessarily 
enhances the likelihood that efficient corporate practices will result.
129
 
B. Encapsulated Trust Revitalized 
A revitalized sense of trust could provide a means to escape the tragedy 
of transparency that threatens the viability of CSR. As the prior section 
established, the hodgepodge of perverse incentives currently influencing 
corporate behavior, and systemic information failures that undermine the 
ability of shareholders and other constituencies to make sense of corporate 
communication, seem at least amenable to correction through an enhanced 
emphasis on a fiduciary duty of disclosure. That the existing legal 
landscape can accommodate a corporate disclosure obligation based on 
common law fiduciary duties represents a necessary, but certainly not a 
sufficient, defense of such a disclosure duty. Articulating a philosophically 
robust sense of trust upon which to build a coherent duty of disclosure 
represents the task ahead.  
The goal, however, is not really to advocate adoption of a particular 
kind of trust. Instead, the project remains a limited conditional 
investigation. Rather than defending one concept of trust as necessarily 
superior to all other potential accounts, the aim is to explicate with 
philosophical rigor a particular type of trust and then to explore the 
ramifications of employing that sense of trust to support a fiduciary duty 
of disclosure. In essence, this Article takes a particular philosophy of trust 
for a ―test drive‖ and determines whether that disciplined sense of trust 
could alleviate the disclosure failures currently plaguing corporate law and 
business practices. The conditional methodology should make the project 
at hand seem quite modest and uncontroversial in scope—for the 
arguments advanced here cannot effectively rule out other notions of trust 
that might provide equal or even greater benefits. What the conditional 
methodology does demonstrate, however, is the usefulness of at least one 
disciplined and philosophically rigorous account of trust in articulating the 
foundations of common law disclosure duties. And even with that limited 
reach, the project may still provide a means to preserve the basic viability 
of CSR. 
With the conditional nature of the project firmly understood, what 
sense of trust might allow corporations, consumers, and investors to 
escape the tragedy of transparency currently afflicting corporate 
 
 
 129. See infra Part IV.A. 
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communication? Although many disparate notions of trust exist,
130
 the 
concept of ―encapsulated trust‖131 seems to possess a potentially 
significant connection to corporate law generally and corporate disclosure 
obligations in particular. In simple terms, encapsulated trust constitutes a 
rational expectation that others will take our interests into account when 
determining what course of action to pursue.
132
 The contours of 
encapsulated trust remain rather malleable, however, and change 
depending upon the context within which encapsulated trust occurs.
133
 
While the most basic form of encapsulated trust manifests itself in 
interpersonal relationships,
134
 encapsulated trust extends to institutions as 
well.
135
 Properly understanding what encapsulated trust entails, then, 
requires an appropriate examination of how the nature of encapsulated 
trust changes in each context.  
An examination of those contexts reveals that encapsulated trust may 
provide a basis for constructing a general theory of corporate disclosure 
duties, though perhaps not a useful tool for understanding the proper 
contours of corporate speech rights in every conceivable context. 
Nevertheless, encapsulated trust still represents a potentially powerful 
analytical principle to understand the proper limitations of corporate 
communications. That usefulness depends on the deep-seeded role that 
 
 
 130. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Communal Exchange Trust Norms: Their Value Base and 
Relevance to Institutional Trust, in TRUST & GOVERNANCE 46 (1998) (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret 
Levi eds., 1998) (describing trust as a product of shared social values); Phillip Pettit, Republican 
Theory and Political Trust, in TRUST & GOVERNANCE 295 (1998) (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret 
Levi eds., 1998) (linking notions of trust to civic political theory); ROBERT C. SOLOMON & FERNANDO 
FLORES, BUILDING TRUST IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND LIFE 7 (2001) (characterizing 
trust as an emotional skill that arises in the context of a variety of dynamic, ongoing relationships); 
Tom R. Tyler & Roderick M. Kramer, Whither Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 5–7 (Roderick M. 
Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (setting forth various social conceptions of trust rooted in moral 
psychology); ERIC M. USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST (2002) (arguing that trust 
represents a moral commitment independent of personal interactions); Cross, supra note 86, at 1461 
(articulating a concept of trust based on cognitive and emotional affect); O.E. Williamson, 
Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 34 J.L. & ECON. 453, 453–86 (1993) (advancing 
trust as a product of rational expectation of future cooperation).  
 131. Although a variety of trust scholars embrace a similar account of trust, the encapsulated 
interest account of trust is generally attributed to Russell Hardin. See RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST (2006); 
RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS (2002) [hereinafter HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS]; 
Russell Hardin, Distrust: Manifestations and Management, in DISTRUST 3–33 (Russell Hardin ed., 
2004) [hereinafter Hardin, Distrust]; Russell Hardin, Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions, in THE 
STRATEGY OF CHOICE 185 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991). 
 132. KAREN S. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST? 5–6 (2005). 
 133. Id. at 104–87 (detailing various institutional and state contexts within which encapsulated 
trust plays a role). 
 134. Id. at 5; Hardin, Distrust, supra note 131, at 6. 
 135. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 20–26. 
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trust already plays in the corporate realm.
136
 And at least within that 
peculiar setting, the concept of trust seems to provide some guidance on 
how to avoid the tragedy of transparency currently threatening the CSR 
movement. 
Understanding the role that encapsulated trust might play in assessing 
the appropriate level of corporate disclosures requires setting forth what 
that particular account of trust entails. In common discourse, the concept 
of trust does not seem terribly baffling. Whether appearing in common 
slogans such as ―In God We Trust‖ or used in casual conversation, trust 
plays an almost mundane role in shaping our ordinary relationships and 
expectations.
137
 We trust our friends not to betray important confidences, 
teachers trust their students not to cheat on exams, and even some voters 
(perhaps unwisely) trust that candidates will deliver on promises made 
during election campaigns.
138
 Rather than existing as some abstruse 
principle, then, trust seems to represent a sentiment with which we all 
have some innate affinity or shared experience.
139
 Although we may not 
articulate explicitly the definition of trust upon which we rely, the 
meaning of trust seems intelligible enough for us to embrace it as part of 
our daily lives.
140
  
On a more analytical level, however, trust seems somewhat difficult to 
pin down. At the outset, disagreement abounds regarding at what level of 
human interaction trust occurs.
141
 While some suggest that trust can only 
be understood as a relationship between familiar individuals,
142 
others 
suggest that a robust sense of social or communal trust pervades society as 
well.
143 
In addition, there is little consensus with respect to what features 
mark the core characteristics of trust. According to some interpretations, 
for example, taking a personal risk represents a defining element of trust, 
while certain alternative approaches deny that any meaningful connection 
 
 
 136. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 137. See SOLOMON & FLORES, supra note 130, at 3–15. 
 138. Id.  
 139. See MARTIN HOLLIS, TRUST WITHIN REASON 10–11 (1998); SOLOMON & FLORES, supra 
note 130, at 3–15. 
 140. See USLANER, supra note 130, at 1–13 (describing trust as the ―chicken soup of social life‖). 
 141. William W. Bratton, Never Trust a Corporation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 867 (2002); see 
also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 173, 
179–85 (2007) (discussing various interpersonal levels at which trustworthiness takes shape). 
 142. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Formal Structure and Social Reality, in TRUST: MAKING AND 
BREAKING SOCIAL RELATIONS (D. Gambetta ed., 1988). 
 143. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Communal and Exchange Trust Norms: Their Value Base and 
Relevance to Institutional Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 49, 65 (V. Braithwaite & M. Levi eds., 
1998). 
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exists between risk and trust.
144
 While one conception focuses on the 
expectation of reciprocity,
145 
another asserts that trust is simply an ethical 
demand for individuals to be ―taken seriously‖ by others.146 Refusing to 
adopt any single position on the appropriate scope and definition of trust, 
Professor Margaret Levi contends that ―[t]rust is not one thing and does 
not have one source; it has a variety of forms and causes.‖147 Regardless of 
the credibility of that protean account, Levi‘s approach perhaps at least 
underscores the notion that a fundamental lack of consensus exists with 
respect to what trust entails.  
Considering the variety of meanings attributed to the concept of trust, a 
pointed examination of the potential nexus between trust and corporate 
disclosure duties requires specifying at the start exactly which particular 
conception of trust is at stake. Of course, selecting one definition of trust 
among many competing alternatives necessarily limits the scope of the 
examination and, perhaps, the significance of the conclusions drawn. But 
unless the intent is to provide a general survey of the potential connections 
between corporate law and all extant notions of trust,
148
 drifting from one 
conception of trust to another would only lead to muddy analysis. And the 
intent here is not to provide some broad semantic survey. Instead, the goal 
is to trace the relationship, if any, between one specific construction of 
trust and corporate disclosure obligations.  
So rather than wading through all the manifold meanings of trust, this 
analysis focuses on the connections between corporate fiduciary duties and 
the particular concept of encapsulated trust. With the selection of the 
concept of trust out of the way, explicating the contours of encapsulated 
trust represents the obvious next step in the investigation.  
1. Tenets of Encapsulated Trust 
The basic characteristics of encapsulated trust are borrowed in large 
part from an account developed by noted philosopher Russell Hardin. 
Although a proper understanding of the nature and import of encapsulated 
 
 
 144. For a conception of trust that requires a sense of personal risk, see Philip Pettit, The Cunning 
of Trust, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202, 204, 208 (1995). For an account of trust that denies the importance 
of risk, see OLLI LAGERSPETZ, TRUST: THE TACIT DEMAND 3 (1998). 
 145. See, e.g., MARTIN HOLLIS, TRUST WITHIN REASON 144–50, 159 (1998). 
 146. See, e.g., OLLI LAGERSPETZ, TRUST: THE TACIT DEMAND 156–57 (1998). 
 147. Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 79 (V. Braithwaite & M. Levi 
eds., 1998). 
 148. For a brief survey of various theoretical accounts of trust and their potential pitfalls, however, 
see Russell Hardin, Conceptions and Explanations of Trust, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 3–36 (Karen S. 
Cook ed., 2001) [hereinafter Hardin, Explanations]. 
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trust goes somewhat further than what Hardin describes (as discussed 
below),
149
 Hardin‘s initial construction provides a proper starting point. 
For using Hardin‘s account as a philosophical springboard helps identify 
certain core characteristics, which when construed more broadly, 
potentially sustain some meaningful connection between encapsulated 
trust and the standards for corporate disclosures of social information.  
First, encapsulated trust represents a special agency relationship.
150
 
That agency relationship exists to the extent that we expect those in whom 
we place our trust to take our interests into account when determining how 
to act.
151 
Thus, in order for me to trust another person according to the 
encapsulated interest account, I must expect that the person I trust remains 
somehow bound by her own motives to protect or advance my particular 
interests. Although the description of the characteristics of encapsulated 
trust that follow more fully flesh out the kind of interests at stake and the 
nature of the expectations involved, the concept of agency provides a 
useful heuristic for understanding the proximity or privity that 
encapsulated trust requires. After all, the essential characteristic marking 
the existence of an agency relationship, at least in legal terms, is an 
explicit or implicit grant of authority to act on another‘s behalf.152 To the 
extent encapsulated trust represents an agency relationship, that sense of 
trust necessarily involves vesting in others the authority to act on my 
behalf.  
Second, trust represents a three-part relationship.
153
 Rather than simply 
existing as some nebulous emotion unattached to particular circumstances, 
trust as encapsulated interest exists when ―A trusts B to do x (or with 
 
 
 149. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 150. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 10–13; Russell Hardin, Trust in 
Government, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 12–13 (V. Braithwaite & M. Levy eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
Hardin, Trust in Government]. 
 151. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 10; see also Russell Hardin, Do We Want 
Trust in Government?, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 26 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) [hereinafter 
Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?]:  
To say that I trust you with respect to some matter means that I have reason to expect you to 
act in my interest with respect to that matter because you have good reasons to do so, reasons 
that are grounded in my interest. In other words, to say that I trust you means I have reason to 
expect you to act, for your own reasons, as my agent with respect to the relevant matter. Your 
interest encapsulates my interest. 
Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 147, at 26. 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2008). 
 153. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 7, 9–10. But see Hardin, Explanations, supra note 148, at 
13–16 (discussing conceptions of trust based on a two-part relationship taking the form, for example, 
―I trust her‖.). 
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respect to x).‖154 The point of this construction is to make clear that our 
trust remains tethered to specific situations. In other words, the 
expectations upon which encapsulated trust relies vary depending on the 
particular circumstances at hand. To use Hardin‘s example, ―I trust you to 
return the money for your morning cup of coffee, but I might not trust you 
with an unsecured loan of thousands of dollars for your down payment on 
a house.‖155 Encapsulated trust, then, requires some attentiveness to 
particularity, to the circumstances within which people find themselves 
situated at any given time.
156
  
Third, rational expectation plays an essential role in encapsulated 
trust.
157
 Although Hardin‘s articulation of the basic agency relationship 
makes clear that encapsulated trust depends on individual expectations of 
another‘s motives,158 Hardin takes great pains to underscore that trust as 
encapsulated interest requires much more than ―reasonable factual 
expectation.‖159 Trust cannot simply manifest itself through inductive 
reasoning about the effects of the actions of others. Unless we expect that 
others take our interests into account in determining how to act, we cannot 
trust them, despite great certainty that their actions will comport with our 
interests in the end.
160
 Were trust simply to manifest itself through an 
ability to predict how others might act, nothing would distinguish trust 
from expectation itself.
161
 For example, though I may predict confidently 
that The New York Times will publish a paper each day, I cannot properly 
describe that expectation as trust unless I believe the Times took my 
particular interests into account in following that course of action. Unlike 
simple expectation, encapsulated trust relies on my expectation that others 
will act motivated in part by my particular interests.
162
  
Although the encapsulated interest account of trust clearly relies on a 
special kind of rational expectation, it seems wrong to propose that 
encapsulated trust involves something beyond rational expectation.
163
 
Properly construed, encapsulated trust is limited to a special subset within 
the universe of potential rational expectations. Only those expectations 
 
 
 154. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 26. 
 155. Id.; see also HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 9–10. 
 156. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST?, supra note 132, at 8. 
 157. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 7–9. 
 158. See id.; see also COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST?, supra note 132, at 8. 
 159. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 13–14. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST?, supra note 132, at 6–7. 
 163. See Hardin, Explanations, supra note 148, at 20; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 
150, at 14–16. 
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that touch upon the motivations of others suffice to support my trust in 
another.
164
 While encapsulated trust may indeed depend on rational 
expectations of a certain sort, nothing beyond rational expectation (such as 
blind hope, belief in God, etc.) can sustain trust.
165
 Therefore, Hardin‘s 
claim that it is wrong to construe trust as ―nothing more than the 
reasonable factual expectation that another will behave in a relevant 
manner‖ seems somewhat flawed.166 In a very real sense, not only is 
encapsulated trust nothing more than reasonable factual expectation, it is 
even less. Encapsulated trust cannot exist without rational expectation and 
only a special subset of rational expectations suffices to support 
expressions of trust.  
Fourth, the interests and motivations necessary to support encapsulated 
trust occupy a broad range of rational and non-rational concerns.
167
 At first 
blush, this may seem at odds with the rational expectation requirement just 
discussed. But no such incompatibility really exists. Encapsulated trust 
manifests itself as a reasonable expectation that those in whom I place my 
trust take my interests into account in determining how to act.
168
 But my 
interests and the reasons another may have to act in accord with my 
interests need not be restricted to purely rational concerns. Emotional, 
religious, or a host of other non-rational interests and motivations could 
support a robust sense of encapsulated trust.
169
 As Hardin explains, trust 
exists  
if A expects B to do x because B has a reason to do it that is 
grounded in A. That reason could be an ongoing relationship—
including love, friendship, or mere exchange, as in business—a 
relationship with A that B wants to maintain. Or it could be some 
other interest B has that A somehow influences. For example, A 
may influence B‘s prospects for re-election.170 
Remember that the essential component is that I reasonably expect that 
you will act in a certain way because you take my interests into account. 
The nature of those interests and the reasons you give for acting in a 
 
 
 164. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 13–14. 
 165. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 14–16. 
 166. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 25. 
 167. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 5 (―A fully rational analysis of trust would depend not 
solely on the rational expectations of the truster but also on the commitments, not merely the regularity 
of the trusted.‖); HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 20–21. 
 168. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 23. 
 169. Id.; see also Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 24–25. 
 170. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 26. 
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certain way need not be rationally based as long as I can reasonably expect 
you to take into account my (rational or non-rational) interests in your 
(rational or non-rational) determination of how to behave.
171
  
Fifth, the motivations and interests sufficient to support trust as 
encapsulated interest need not be based on close or continuing personal 
relationships.
172 
Again, encapsulated trust simply requires a reasonable 
expectation that another will take my interests into account in determining 
what course of action to pursue. As long as some rational basis exists for 
my expectation that my interests will motivate your behavior, we need not 
share any sense of kinship or enjoy ongoing experiences in order for trust 
between us to occur.
173
 In dismissing the notion that encapsulated trust 
requires ―thick‖ relationships between individuals, Hardin states  
it is not true that the relevant expectations can be grounded only in 
thick relationships. I can expect you to act well as my agent for the 
reason that you will suffer loss if you do not. This can happen 
because of the iterated nature of our interaction, as in the thick-
relationship model, or because of reputational effects that will 
enable you to benefit from relationships other than ours, or because 
there is an imposed structure of incentives to get you to act well as 
my agent.
174
 
Thus, the interests and motivations necessary to support encapsulated trust 
need not satisfy any terribly onerous conditions. Of course, the strength of 
encapsulated trust might increase to the extent we share a closer 
relationship or the interests at stake seem more firmly supported by sound 
reasoning.
175
 But at a fundamental level, as long as I can reasonably expect 
you will take into account my interests in determining how to act, 
encapsulated trust may still thrive.  
Sixth, encapsulated trust requires a certain competence to assess the 
viability of the trust relationship.
176
 At least for those who impart trust, 
unless we possess sufficient capability to judge the actions and 
motivations of others, we cannot effectively sustain a sense of trust as 
encapsulated interest.
177 
Why? Initially, the very articulation of 
 
 
 171. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 58–60. 
 172. Id. at 21–23; Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 26. 
 173. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 21–23. 
 174. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 27. 
 175. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 23. 
 176. Hardin, Explanations, supra note 148, at 6–7; COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT 
TRUST?, supra note 132, at 5–6. 
 177. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 28. 
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encapsulated trust depends on our ability to assess whether or not others 
will be motivated to take our interests into account.
178
 And once we impart 
trust in others, the maintenance of that trust requires us to assess whether 
or not the actions of others have undermined or fulfilled our expectations. 
Although encapsulated trust does not mandate that we have perfect 
information prior to imparting our trust or negate our ability to trust to the 
extent we make inaccurate factual assessments regarding the motivations 
and actions of others,
179
 trust as encapsulated interest cannot exist as pure 
emotion.
180
 Encapsulated trust represents informed choice. If we do not 
possess the competence to judge the actions and motivations of others—
whether based on lack of information, insufficient expertise, or some other 
defect in our capacity—we simply cannot manifest or sustain a sense of 
trust in others according to the encapsulated interest account.
181
  
In a similar manner, trust as encapsulated interest requires a degree of 
competence from those in whom we place our trust.
182
 Looking back at the 
general description of encapsulated trust as an agency relationship helps 
illustrate the point.
183
 When others act as our agents, they need some 
degree of proficiency to carry out our interests. As Hardin simply states, 
―[i]f A is to trust B, then B must have not only the motivation to do x but 
also the competence. An agent who cannot act on my behalf is a poor 
agent.‖184 Absent some basic competence in pursuing a particular course 
of action, no matter how much another‘s motivations are grounded in my 
interests, that person simply cannot effectively bear my trust.  
Although Hardin does not articulate the connection fully, the notion of 
competence serves as a necessary companion to the rational expectation 
component of encapsulated trust. As previously mentioned, trust as 
encapsulated interest requires a rational expectation that others will take 
into account my interests in determining how to act.
185
 In essence, 
competence serves as the threshold standard for establishing what minimal 
rationality really requires. Without sufficient knowledge about another‘s 
motivations or actions—or the ability to process available information in 
 
 
 178. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 7–9. 
 179. Id. at 58–60; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 20–25. 
 180. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 68–80. 
 181. Id. at 7–8; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 22–24. 
 182. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 7–8. 
 183. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 184. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 28. 
 185. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text; see also Hardin, Explanations, supra note 
148, at 15. 
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some intelligible manner—a person simply lacks the necessary foundation 
for trusting another according to the encapsulated interest account.
186
  
In some sense, though, the criterion of competence seems a bit 
superfluous if the expectations necessary to support encapsulated trust 
must truly be rational. After all, how could expectations be rational if not 
based on minimally sufficient information and logical analysis? What 
competence attempts to capture is a sense of reasonableness that elevates 
somewhat the threshold for trust above the mark set by mere rationality.
187
 
While it may be rational (in some very limited sense of minimally 
plausible) for me to expect another to take my interests into account given 
a limited set of available facts, that rational expectation may not suffice to 
support encapsulated trust if those facts are somehow too flimsy or my 
analysis too strained. What encapsulated trust requires—through the 
criterion of competence—is a more robust sense that my expectation is 
reasonable under the circumstances. Competence thus addresses the level 
of confidence we might reasonably possess in our rational expectations.
188
 
Of course, appealing to a sense of practical reason (or reasonableness 
under the circumstances) provides no greater precision than rationality in 
determining what actually suffices to support encapsulated trust. Still, 
competence perhaps secures a higher quality of knowledge and judgment 
than what mere rationality requires. 
Although Hardin sets forth the basic characteristics of encapsulated 
trust, an understanding of trust as encapsulated interest arguably goes well 
beyond what Hardin describes. In particular, while Hardin generally 
confines the concept of trust as encapsulated interest to interpersonal 
relationships,
189
 individuals may manifest encapsulated trust in 
institutions,
190
 including corporations. Understanding how trust as 
encapsulated interest extends to institutions, however, requires building on 
the basic mechanics of encapsulated trust in less abstract contexts.  
In its elementary form, encapsulated trust exists as a simple 
interpersonal relationship. Clearly, that simple interpersonal relationship 
represents the primary focus of Hardin‘s construction of encapsulated 
trust. Recall that a Hardin trust exists as a three-part relationship where ―A 
trusts B to do x (or with respect to x).‖191 To the extent we can rationally 
 
 
 186. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 10–11. 
 187. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 21–24, 58–68. 
 188. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST?, supra note 132, at 6–7. 
 189. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 21. 
 190. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 15–19; Hardin, Do We Want Trust in 
Government?, supra note 151, at 25–28; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 15–17. 
 191. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in government?, supra note 151, at 26; see supra notes 152–53 
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expect others to take into account our interests in determining what course 
of action to pursue, we can meaningfully describe that relationship as 
encapsulated trust.
192
 At its core, this basic manifestation of encapsulated 
trust on the interpersonal level primarily relies on subjective perceptions. 
In order for me to trust another, what truly matters is my subjective 
understanding of my own interests and expectations.
193 
Of course, these 
subjective perceptions are minimally tempered by the notion of 
competence, an objective constraint that addresses not only the factual and 
cognitive sufficiency of my own beliefs but also the proficiency of others 
to act as my agent. Still, despite the slight ―quality control‖ function which 
competence attempts to provide, encapsulated trust in interpersonal 
relationships remains largely subjective.
194
 Absent some fundamental flaw 
in the formulation of my expectations or the capabilities of those in whom 
I trust, encapsulated trust on the interpersonal level exists simply to the 
extent I expect that others will take into account my interests in 
determining how to act.
195
 Most certainly, the very definition of 
encapsulated trust imposes a certain framework, a structure that places 
some constraints on what properly constitutes trust. But even within that 
special framework, at least on the basic level of interpersonal 
relationships, encapsulated trust remains largely a product of subjective 
awareness.  
Radiating beyond the confines of simple interpersonal relationships, 
the structure of encapsulated trust logically extends to institutions. Even 
Hardin acknowledges that from a theoretical standpoint at least, 
encapsulated trust seems possible between individuals and institutions. 
Although raising doubts that more than a few individuals could properly 
place their trust in institutions within the framework of encapsulated 
interest, Hardin concedes that ―[n]evertheless, the encapsulated-interest 
conception of trust can be generalized to fit institutions.‖196 As Hardin 
explains, encapsulated trust in an institution makes some sense in at least 
two situations:  
 
 
and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text. 
 193. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 8–9. 
 194. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 13–15; HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 
6–8. 
 195. See supra notes 173–88 and accompanying text. 
 196. Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 16; see also id. at 13 (―[I]t is clear that in 
principle—that is to say, conceptually—individuals can trust government, or at least parts of it or some 
of its agents, even under the relatively demanding notion of trust as encapsulated interest.‖). 
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How, then, can we make sense of trusting an institution if trust 
requires grounding in the interests of the institution and its agents? 
There are at least two ways we might unpack our trust of an 
institution. First, we could trust every individual in the organization, 
each in the relevant ways, to do what each must do if the 
organization is to fulfill our trust. Second, we could know that the 
design of the roles and their related incentives will induce role-
holders to do what they must do if the organization is to fulfill our 
trust. Here we essentially trust the structure of incentives to get 
individual officeholders to act well as our agents. In this case, the 
individual role-holders might be broadly interchangeable, and we 
need know few, if any, of them.
197
 
To the extent we possess sufficient information regarding the 
individual actors representing the institution, trust in an institution is really 
no different than the basic form of encapsulated trust in interpersonal 
relationships. We simply reconfigure our sense of the institution as a 
whole to its component individual parts. Absent that particularized 
knowledge of the actors within an institution, we can still place our trust in 
an institution to the extent we possess an adequate understanding of the 
institutional design that produces incentives for individuals to act on our 
behalf.
198
 As long as we understand sufficiently the incentives that 
motivate individual actors within the institution, we may sensibly place 
our trust in the institution itself. 
But what Hardin accepts in theory he rejects in practice. With respect 
to knowing the individual actors within an institution, Hardin seriously 
doubts that anyone could know enough of the institutional role-holders to 
form intelligent expectations regarding their motivations.
199
 And with 
respect to basing encapsulated trust on knowledge of institutional design, 
Hardin states that 
[F]ew people can have an articulate understanding of the structures 
of various agencies and the roles within them or of the overall 
government to be confident of the incentives that role-holders have 
to be trustworthy. Hence, as a matter of actual practice, it is utterly 
 
 
 197. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 29; see also HARDIN, TRUST, 
supra note 131, at 151–73, 191–93; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 22. 
 198. HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 20–23; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra 
note 150, at 22. 
 199. Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 22. 
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implausible that trust underlies most citizens‘ views and 
expectations of government.
200
 
For Hardin, then, institutional trust simply remains out of reach for 
most people given the information requirements that encapsulated trust 
necessarily entails. 
While Hardin provides solid reasons for dismissing the feasibility of 
encapsulated trust in enormous and interconnected bureaucratic agencies, 
his analysis does not seem particularly trenchant with respect to more 
parochial institutions. In local settings where institutions may be tidy and 
small, many members of the community might sensibly trust in institutions 
within the demanding framework of encapsulated interest. Take as an 
example the town council of a small suburban community lying on the 
outskirts of some larger metropolitan area. Even in a community of several 
thousand residents, it does not seem terribly outlandish for many members 
of the community to know each and every member of the five-person 
committee in charge of local administrative matters. Moreover, where the 
entire local police department consists of a police chief, four uniformed 
officers and two secretaries, it does not seem implausible for many in the 
community to understand in sufficient detail the web of structural 
incentives motivating the institutional actors. At least to the extent 
institutions remain sufficiently small, then, we may sensibly trust in 
institutions in the very way that Hardin believes would be ―utterly 
implausible‖.201  
To be fair, however, Hardin made clear that his discussion of 
encapsulated trust in institutions focused on government broadly 
conceived.
202
 And the goal here is not to quibble with the level of 
institutional complexity at which encapsulated trust becomes 
unintelligible. Instead, the import of the example is to preserve the 
viability of encapsulated trust—both conceptually and in practice—
beyond the confines of simple interpersonal relationships. Why? Because 
as encapsulated trust extends outward from interpersonal relationships, the 
nature of encapsulated trust changes somewhat. In interpersonal 
relationships, encapsulated trust remains highly subjective. While the 
notion of competence places some constraints on what sensibly counts as 
trust, those constraints seem rather minimal in the interpersonal setting. In 
 
 
 200. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 30; see also Hardin, Trust in 
Government, supra note 150, at 23. 
 201. Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 22. 
 202. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 151–52; Hardin, Trust in Government, supra note 150, at 
19–22. 
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contrast, objective constraints play a much more crucial and substantive 
role in the context of institutional encapsulated trust.
203
 Simply put, the 
informational and cognitive hurdles are much more difficult to surmount. 
Either we need to know each of the actors within an institution or we need 
to understand the detailed scheme of incentives that motivates each of the 
institutional actors who remain unfamiliar to us. Thus, where the objective 
criterion of competence plays only an ancillary role for manifesting 
encapsulated trust in interpersonal relationships, competence occupies 
center stage for institutional trust. Without a high level of factual and 
cognitive sophistication, we simply cannot properly trust in institutions 
according to the encapsulated interest account. As encapsulated trust 
moves beyond the confines of interpersonal relationships to institutions, 
then, the objective constraints become more stringent with respect to what 
trust necessarily entails.  
2. Encapsulated Trust in Corporate Contexts 
With that understanding of how different contexts change somewhat 
the basic mechanics of encapsulated trust, the conceptual leap to trust in 
the context of disclosure obligations becomes more accessible. In light of 
the definitional requirements of encapsulated trust, however, several 
pressing questions still spring to mind. In whom or what do I place my 
trust? How can a corporation effectively take into account my interests? 
What level of competence is required to sustain a sense of encapsulated 
trust in that context? The answers to those questions, though closely 
intertwined, provide a firm foundation for understanding how 
encapsulated trust presents a useful mechanism for understanding 
corporate disclosure duties.  
So, beginning with the first question, in whom or what do I really place 
my trust? Trust remains firmly bound to the expectations and observations 
of particular individuals within institutions. On the interpersonal level, 
encapsulated trust can only exist to the extent I reasonably expect that 
another will take my interests into account in determining how to act.
204
 
With respect to trust in institutions, trust depends on my personal 
understanding of the incentive structures of the institution or on my 
knowledge of all the actors within the institution.
205
 Regardless of the 
 
 
 203. Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, supra note 151, at 38–40; Hardin, Trust in 
Government, supra note 150, at 23–24. 
 204. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2009] TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY 159 
 
 
 
 
shape encapsulated interest takes, on a fundamental level, encapsulated 
trust cannot be expressed without reference to the particular circumstances 
of the trusting and the trusted.  
In the case of corporate communications, even though the human 
author of any particular disclosure may remain hidden, the well 
established hierarchical structure of the corporate form makes the officers 
and directors of the corporation the obvious locus of our trust. Indeed, 
under state corporate and federal securities laws, officers and directors 
remain ultimately liable for fraudulent statements of the corporation.
206
 It 
is the very rigidity of the corporate form itself and the legal imposition of 
fiduciary duties on directors and officers that makes those particular actors 
the reciprocal participants in a trusting relationship with consumers and 
investors.  
Our expectations that corporate actors are grounded in the interests of 
investors and consumers should not exclusively control whether or not 
encapsulated trust remains intelligible. Even if we ignore what motivates 
another to follow a particular course of action, we can still manifest 
encapsulated trust in communication to the extent the governmental 
authority considers our interests in determining what adherence to the 
disclosure duty permits or prohibits in a particular context.
207
 So rather 
than merely resting on my expectations of what motivates another to act, 
my sense of encapsulated trust should also address whether or not I 
reasonably believe the governmental decision to allow the action of 
another was grounded in my interests in the right at stake.
208
 Most 
certainly, that governmental decision may require untangling the 
motivations of others whose actions give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty 
 
 
 206. See Siebecker, supra note 9, at 651–55; see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 13–15 (2005); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy 
Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 941–42 (2003) (stating that 
new anti-fraud provisions under Sarbanes-Oxley ―were already in effect due to requirements imposed 
by stock exchanges, regulators, state law, or other provisions of federal law. Others were widely 
accepted and followed as best practices‖); David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate 
Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155, 155–68 (2005) (describing the two-tier system of state and federal 
corporate fraud regulation). 
 207. Hardin certainly doubts that individuals might possess the requisite knowledge and 
familiarity with government to trust in any meaningful sense. See HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 
39–40. Still, that criticism focuses on the inability of individuals to know the incentives of the actors 
within the institutional setting. If the governmental standards for assessing and enforcing corporate 
disclosure obligations made direct references to encapsulated trust, it would seem entirely plausible for 
individuals to manifest a meaningful sense of trust in the governmental application of that particular 
standard.  
 208. For a discussion on the role that legal sanction plays in sustaining trust, see HARDIN, 
TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 127–28. 
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claim. The viability of encapsulated trust in corporate disclosures will 
often depend on the grounds articulated for permitting or prohibiting the 
actions of others.  
But how do corporate actors effectively take into account my interests? 
At least from a theoretical standpoint, the requirement that we must 
reasonably expect our interests to be taken into account does not pose a 
terribly difficult problem. To the extent the actions of individuals, 
institutions, or governmental authorities are motivated by our interests 
through a particular legal obligation, our sense of encapsulated trust may 
thrive.
209
 Still, it seems rather difficult to believe that a corporation took 
my interests into account in deciding not to disclose information I 
specifically demanded—in fact, this would seem wholly at odds with my 
interests. The answer lies in our ability to articulate some underlying 
justification that supports the actions of the corporation in a particular 
context. So, even if I think that the corporation acted in a way that 
undermined my immediate self-interest, I might still trust that the 
corporation acted in my interests if it were possible to locate some greater 
good that is maintained through permitting those seemingly harmful or 
unsatisfying acts of another. Locating the underlying justifications that 
support a sense of encapsulated trust as governing a fiduciary duty of 
disclosure, however, presents a rather difficult task. The process involves a 
certain degree of detachment from our own immediate self-interest and an 
attentiveness to the interests of other stakeholders.  
So what level of competence does encapsulated trust require in the 
corporate communication context? Remember that competence addresses 
the factual and cognitive sufficiency of the expectations that support 
encapsulated trust.
210
 In the case of interpersonal relationships, 
competence plays only a minor ―quality control‖ function that attempts to 
secure some sense of reasonableness slightly above the mark set by mere 
rationality.
211
 With respect to encapsulated trust in institutions, the 
criterion of competence has much more bite. Because encapsulated trust in 
institutions requires knowing each of the individual actors within an 
institution or understanding in sufficient detail the internal scheme of 
incentives the institution provides, encapsulated trust cannot sensibly 
 
 
 209. The ability to trust based on the availability of legal sanction seems wholly compatible with 
the architecture of encapsulated trust, at least to the extent those sanctions directly address the very 
existence—and enforceability—of encapsulated trust as a fiduciary duty. But see HARDIN, 
TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 47–48. 
 210. See supra notes 175–87 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
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occur without a broad factual foundation or a well-developed capacity to 
understand the workings of the institution itself.
212
 As long as consumers 
and investors remain confident that the scope of the fiduciary duties owed 
by officers and directors remains precisely consonant with what 
encapsulated trust requires, investors and consumers can sensibly trust 
those institutional corporate actors. 
So with that basic understanding, how would courts apply encapsulated 
trust in the context of a fiduciary duty of disclosure? Arguably, if 
challenged, directors and officers would need to demonstrate that in 
making a particular disclosure, they competently took into account the 
interests of shareholders regarding the substance and form of the 
disclosure. Turning to the Monster.com example used at the outset, if a 
disgruntled shareholder argued that Monster.com officers and directors 
violated their duty of care by failing to disclose effectively material 
information, company actors would simply need to demonstrate the 
decision to ―quietly post[] an online notice‖213 about a data security breach 
took into account shareholder interests following an ongoing dialogue 
about the content, form, and timing of disclosures on such matters. In 
essence, the duty is a process-based standard that relies on enhanced 
discourse to improve the integrity of decisions on corporate disclosures. 
Although perhaps rather modest in scope, that emphasis on improved 
discourse between the corporations and their constituencies should provide 
substantial improvements over the current disclosure regime. 
It seems that the encapsulated interest account of trust could fit within 
the existing legal framework of fiduciary duties owed by officers and 
directors to the corporations and shareholders they serve. And it is 
precisely because that fiduciary duty framework is extant that an 
encapsulated interest account of trust seems viable. While the ability to 
trust in institutions might arise infrequently, the duty of trust that already 
exists at the core of corporate law makes the encapsulated account of trust 
a rather easy fit. 
IV. REPERCUSSIONS OF ENCAPSULATED TRUST 
So what are the implications of embracing encapsulated trust as 
governing the content of the officers‘ and directors‘ fiduciary duties 
regarding corporate disclosures? Adopting such a philosophically robust 
foundation for a duty of disclosure produces some significant benefits 
 
 
 212. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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including enhanced efficiency, greater stakeholder engagement, and 
improved business and legal ethics.  
A. Efficiency 
Perhaps the most interesting implication from a theoretical standpoint 
is the promotion of an efficient level of corporate communication.
214
 At 
the outset, claiming that an encapsulated account of trust promotes 
efficiency may seem particularly odd, considering the trust remains an 
intensely normative construct.
215
 Nonetheless, at least compared to current 
standards for disclosure, fiduciary duties governed under an encapsulated 
interest enhance the likelihood of a Pareto efficient outcome regarding the 
content of disclosure duties.  
In order for directors and officers to fulfill a duty of encapsulated trust 
regarding corporate disclosures, they need to take into account the 
interests of the corporation‘s shareholders.216 According to the 
encapsulated interest account, however, it is not enough simply to imagine 
the interests of a particular shareholder, such as a rational, self-interested 
stockholder bent on maximizing short-term gain.
217
 Instead, the 
encapsulated interest account requires taking seriously and encapsulating 
the actual interests of those who have given their trust.
218
 To the extent 
some shareholders possess preferences for long-term gain, fair labor 
practices, living wages, environmental sustainability or charitable giving, 
the views of those shareholders must be taken as they exist. Contrary to 
 
 
 214. ―Pareto Efficiency‖ represents a particular concept of efficiency articulated by Vilfredo 
Pareto. See generally VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1971). According to 
Pareto, an efficient allocation of resources exists when no person could be made better off without 
making another individual worse off. Id. Although other notions of efficiency exist, this Article 
employs the traditional economic understanding of Pareto efficiency. For a discussion of competing 
theories of efficiency, see Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: 
The Integration of Fairness Into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 267 n.80 (1998). 
 215. See Barbara Fried, Is As Ought: The Case of Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1375, 1386–89 
(discussing the incompatibility between efficiency and normative theory); Eric A. Posner, Law, 
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996) (addressing the likely inefficiency 
of norms in regulating behavior); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A 
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1241 n.13 (2005) (identifying tensions 
between the narrative efficiency and normative property rights theories). 
 216. Encapsulated trust would require taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, such 
as employees, community members, or suppliers, to the extent that shareholders care about those 
constituencies. Thus, although not requiring in the first instance consideration of stakeholder views, 
encapsulated trust requires taking into account interests of shareholders whose views may themselves 
extend to stakeholder concerns. 
 217. HARDIN, TRUST, supra note 131, at 58–60; HARDIN, TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 131, at 
16–18. 
 218. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST?, supra note 132, at 5–6. 
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much traditional law and economics scholarship that receives fast criticism 
for adopting a highly stylized and stilted view of the human condition as 
the basis for defining the content of the law,
219
 an encapsulated interest 
account adopts a much more behavioral economics approach.
220
 But that 
behavioral sensitivity necessarily marks a Pareto improvement. Simply 
divining the law based on assumptions of what rationality entails cannot 
come nearly as close as a behaviorally sensitive approach to 
approximating the bargain actual parties would strike regarding the desired 
content disclosure duties.
221
  
A fiduciary duty based on encapsulated trust promotes efficiency, then, 
because it forces attention on the full panoply of actual actors and their 
expressed interests. While cognitive dissonance problems affecting 
accurate articulation and assessment of interests may still persist,
222
 
 
 
 219. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 46, at 1657: 
Important trends in legal education and legal theory, however, complicate the goal of 
producing lawyers who will take a Hartian perspective and who will understand companies‘ 
need for social legitimacy. Chief among those trends, in my view, is the teaching of 
―primitive‖ law and economics, which has taken the neoclassical economist‘s stylized picture 
of the person, homo economicus, a self-interested utility maximizer, and has assumed that this 
two-dimensional person occupies the real world, subjecting every aspect of life to a cost-
benefit analysis, including decisions about law compliance. 
Id. 
 220. For a description of the distinction between a classical economic approach to understanding 
human behavior and a behavioral economic sensitivity, see Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T 
Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1667 (2003):  
The essential inaccuracy of the rational man model has minimized the capacity of law and 
economics to generate useful insights in many areas of the law. Dissatisfaction with this state 
of affairs gave rise to a movement, variously called Behavioral Law and Economics (BLE), 
Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), and Legal Decision Theory (LDT), that seeks to provide 
a more descriptively and predictively accurate account of human behavior; this is done by 
replacing the law and economics movement‘s stylized rational man model with a more 
accurate model based on empirical research arising from psychology, cognitive science, 
behavioral biology, decision theory, and related fields. 
Id. 
 221. Id.; see also Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis 
of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2001):  
In recent years, however, a group of scholars has devoted considerable insight and energy to 
the project of behavioral law and economics. This emerging subdiscipline fuses traditional 
neoclassical economic analysis with lessons drawn from cognitive psychology and decision 
theory research. The result is a law and economics grounded in assumptions that comport 
better with observed real-world behavior than the stylized rational actor model featured in 
conventional law and economics. The fruits of this effort are now dominating new research in 
law journals, such that it is no overstatement to conclude, ―The future of economic analysis of 
law lies in new and better understandings of decision and choice.‖  
Kysar, supra note 221, at 4–5 (citations omitted); see also Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral 
Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 581, 583–89 (2002). 
 222. See Paredes, supra note 59, at 443–44. 
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refocusing the content of fiduciary duties through the lens of encapsulated 
trust prevents ignoring players who should enjoy a seat at the bargaining 
table.  
Moreover, the sense of competence necessary to assess accurately 
shareholder (or stakeholder) interests will require a more substantial 
dialogue between the corporation and its shareholders. Because 
encapsulated trust requires actual knowledge of the interests being 
encapsulated,
223
 corporations arguably could not fulfill that duty without 
reaching out to shareholders. Some of those shareholders may fit the 
classical economic profile of self-interested rational beings dedicated to 
maximizing short-term wealth.
224
 But if other shareholders interested in 
social responsibility exist, corporations must engage to assess their 
interests effectively.
225
 That engagement would have to cover not just the 
underlying content of CSR concerns but also the kind of disclosures 
necessary to assess corporate practices in those areas. In essence, 
embracing an encapsulated-interest-based fiduciary duty would bring real 
shareholders and real shareholder interests into the corporate decision-
making process, without giving shareholders any direct control over the 
course the business takes.  
Most certainly, disclosure duties founded on encapsulated trust would 
not cure all of the systemic information failures threatening the viability of 
CSR. A more philosophically robust sense of encapsulated trust simply 
cannot ensure with any certainty that corporations will disclose only 
perfectly tailored, wholly truthful information that permits the most 
effective assessment of CSR practices. But there should be some 
improvement, especially with respect to the ability to engage in brazen 
greenwash or obfuscation without fear of detection. Fiduciary duties based 
 
 
 223. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra Part II.A. 
 225. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the need to assess the 
actual preferences and profiles of diverse stakeholders in corporate law, see Helen Anderson, 
Creditors‟ Rights of Recovery: Economic Theory, Corporate Jurisprudence and the Role of Fairness, 
30 MELB. U.L. REV. 1, 24:  
[T]he long-term viability of the corporate enterprise relies on the cooperation of a range of 
corporate stakeholders. In order to achieve this cooperation, ethics and fairness must be 
considered as a means of fostering trust and reducing risk and its associated costs. While 
directors are allowed to favour one cohort of corporate stakeholders over another, this is only 
permissible where this is in the long-term interests of the company.  
Id.; see also Greenfield, supra note 221, at 622, 635–37, 642–43 (addressing the need to take seriously 
all extant stakeholder interests in order to promote efficiency from a behaviorally sensitive standpoint); 
Cynthia Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002) (promoting a dedication to actual stakeholder and shareholder interests in 
corporate decision making). 
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on an encapsulated account of trust would likely impose a more stringent 
duty of care on officers and directors, at least with respect to the process 
of attending to those duties.
226
 That heightened procedural standard—one 
that requires taking seriously the actual interests of extant shareholders 
and other corporate constituencies—might be enough to escape the 
confines of the Prisoner‘s Dilemma and the reverse Tragedy of the 
Commons that seem to plague the CSR movement.
227
 Quite simply, the 
less likely corporations could deceive without detection and the less likely 
companies could obfuscate through dissemination of vast amounts of 
irrelevant data, the more likely consumers and investors will continue to 
reward companies that embrace CSR. The heightened standard of an 
encapsulated interest account of trust effectively moves the equilibrium 
position to a cooperative outcome where the parties—consumers, 
investors, and the corporation—realize shared gains.228 In that important 
way, a normatively robust account of trust as a basis for fiduciary 
disclosure duties prevents significant economic waste.
229
  
 
 
 226. The precise contours of the duty of care remain open under an encapsulated account. The 
existence of some latent ambiguity, however, does not necessarily detract from the benefits of 
embracing encapsulated trust. It is the change in the process of approaching corporate disclosure, 
rather than a change in the substance of the duties, that marks the primary improvement over the 
existing regulatory regime. So while grounding a fiduciary duty of disclosure on a philosophically 
robust sense of trust may likely enhance disclosure obligations, that substantive change emerges as an 
inevitable repercussion of a more substantial and meaningful procedural change in corporate discourse. 
Whether or not that discourse actually produces more or less disclosure simply does not affect the 
benefit of tethering more closely corporate disclosure practices to the interests of shareholders and 
other corporate constituencies. And it is precisely that enhanced connection between corporate 
practices and constituency interests in the context of disclosure that could help remove the existing 
threat to the economic viability of CSR and SRI.  
 227. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 453, 462–63 (2006): 
Experimental evidence supports the proposition that trust is a solution to the prisoner‘s 
dilemma. Results from prisoner‘s dilemma tournaments, in which each player employs its 
particular strategy against each other player seriatim, show that distrusting strategies fail in 
the long run and more trusting strategies prevail. When players utilizing trusting strategies are 
paired up, they solve the prisoner‘s dilemma in experiments and achieve greater gains than 
those using distrusting strategies.  
Id.; see also Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 495, 498–501 (2001) (describing how trust 
secures a mutually beneficial equilibrium solution for players in the Prisoner‘s Dilemma, while distrust 
results in mutual defection); Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in 
Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1692 (2008) (stating in the context of cartel pricing 
that ―[t]he solution to the prisoner‘s dilemma is mutual trust‖). 
 229. See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 228, at 462–65; Richard H. McAdams, Relative 
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 20–27 (1992) (describing how the prisoner‘s dilemma leads to 
economic and social waste). 
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Some might charge, however, that the inherent flexibility in the 
common law duties would produce a lack of clarity and predictability.
230
 
While the malleable nature of the common law principles might produce 
some advantages, the inherent uncertainty in the method could produce 
significant transaction costs that impede achieving an efficient level of 
corporate disclosure.
231
 Unless the law articulates a set of sufficiently 
concrete standards, corporations could be left foundering without 
sufficient ability to organize their conduct. Moreover, with a more 
stringent duty of disclosure, increased litigation would result as 
shareholders attempt to push corporations for more, or simply different, 
information.
232
 Even good faith efforts by corporations to comply with 
their fiduciary disclosure duties might not allow them to escape the 
enhanced costs of litigation, as courts develop the content of the disclosure 
duty on a case-by-case basis.
233
  
While compelling at first blush, those arguments fail to attend to the 
evolving development of a kind of ―best practices‖234 regarding corporate 
 
 
 230. See Richard J. Agnich & Steven F. Goldstone, What Business Will Look for in Corporate 
Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 6, 9 (2000) (arguing that a fundamental tension 
exists between ―the flexibility that we all cherish so much in the law and the common law versus a 
businessperson‘s need for clarity and predictability‖); William Hoffman, On the Use and Abuse of 
Custom and Usage in Reinsurance Contracts, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 34 (1997) (stating in the context 
of reinsurance contracts that ―[c]ommentators unvaryingly criticize the persistence of the old common 
law tests and call for their reform, pointing to a need for uniformity, clarity, and flexibility in the law‖) 
(citations omitted); see also Siebecker, Cookies, supra note 127, at 944–45. 
 231. See, e.g., Baird & Henderson, supra note 101, at 1333: 
Ridding corporate law entirely of the idea of fiduciary duties would force the 
reconceptualization of a number of features of the law in ways that are potentially healthy. 
We consider one of these here—disclosure. Under current law, directors‘ disclosure 
obligations are tied inexorably to their fiduciary duties. . . . A more sensible approach is one 
that decouples the disclosure obligations from other duties and also makes it easier for 
sophisticated professionals both to opt out of disclosure obligations and opt into them. 
Fiduciary duties restrict free contracting in ways that are plainly inefficient. 
Id. 
 232. See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
300–02 (1991); Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law With Progressive Social 
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1235–38 (2002) (discussing some of the costs associated with more 
stringent standards of disclosure for CSR practices and enhanced stakeholder rights). 
 233. Despite the concern over increased costs, the very availability of litigation may actually 
promote an efficient disclosure rule. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the 
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 72 (1977) (―The tendency toward efficiency is a 
function of the common law process according to which legal rules are generated from the investment 
in litigation by individual parties . . . .‖). 
 234. For a definition of the concept of ―best practices,‖ see David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 297–98 (2006):  
At their core, best practices are a method of regulation that works through horizontal 
modeling rather than hierarchical direction. In a classic best practices scheme, regulated 
entities themselves devise practices to comply with relatively unspecific regulatory 
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disclosure duties. Most certainly, a lack of predictability regarding the 
content of disclosure duties and increased litigation would produce 
significant costs. Those costs, however, do not necessarily impede moving 
toward an efficient level of corporate communication. Instead, those costs 
actually facilitate a Pareto improvement by encouraging corporations to 
pay continual attention to the evolving preferences for disclosure of 
corporate information.  
In contrast, although adhering to static disclosure standards would 
promote predictability, the very immovability of those standards could not 
accommodate changing market preferences regarding the desired content 
of corporate communication.
235
 Efficient corporate communication 
represents the level of disclosure that corporate managers, shareholders, 
consumers, and other stakeholders would hypothetically negotiate in a 
world of perfect information and without the burdens of any transaction 
costs in bargaining.
236
 The precise outcome of that hypothetical 
negotiation would necessarily change as the preferences of any party 
evolve. A rigid set of disclosure standards, however, could not attend to 
changing preferences. To the extent preferences regarding corporate 
disclosure levels change over time, steadfast reliance on static disclosure 
standards would undermine efficiency despite providing predictability.
237
  
Thus, determining whether a malleable fiduciary duty approach or a 
much more static statutory framework enhances the likelihood of an 
efficient level of disclosure depends on an assessment of the nature of 
 
 
requirements. . . . Defined this way, best practices might seem like a benign form of localism 
or subsidiarity, a method of regulation in which central administrators provide advice and 
disseminate information, instead of mandating a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme. Indeed, it 
might suggest a rather democratic form of regulatory experimentalism, in which regulated 
entities experiment with best practices as a way of vindicating the broad principles of various 
regulatory programs, while the regulators keep track of their progress and help to celebrate 
and publicize particularly successful local initiatives. 
Id. 
 235. See Hamermesh, supra note 121, at 1153 (―[A] fiduciary duty of disclosure provides a 
convenient, ready-made substitute for what selling stockholders would want in any event—
presentation of the material facts—and what directors, by virtue of their role as centralized repositories 
of corporate information, are well suited to provide efficiently.‖); see also Funk v. United States, 290 
U.S. 371, 383 (1933) (―It has been said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is 
not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.‖); Paul Rubin, 
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (arguing that common law standards 
promote dispute resolution and decrease litigation costs). 
 236. See Hamermesh, supra note 121, at 1152–54; Williams, supra note 29, at 1201–03. 
 237. See Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market—A 
Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1829 (1998) (―Even when harmonized standards are formed, it 
will take a long time until they are implemented. By then, economic conditions might have changed, 
causing the unified standards to become outdated and making renegotiation necessary. Indeed, a static 
structure would surely render the harmonized standards inefficient.‖). 
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market preferences. If those preferences remain static, enduring the costs 
of a malleable approach would seem wholly unnecessary. On the other 
hand, if market preferences regarding the substance and character of 
corporate communication evolve, only a malleable common law approach 
could attend adequately to those changing preferences. The explosive 
growth of CSR and SRI seems to indicate rather clearly that disclosure 
preferences remain subject to change.
238
 To the extent the $2.7 trillion 
dedicated to SRI in the United States generates significant wealth, the 
costs of enduring static disclosure standards become all too clear—it 
produces the tragedy of transparency that threatens the basic viability of 
CSR going forward. So, even if increased litigation and a lack of 
predictability accompany a malleable fiduciary duty of disclosure, those 
costs actually facilitate a Pareto improvement over continued adherence to 
static disclosure duties.  
In the end, a fiduciary duty of disclosure promotes ―best practices‖ to 
develop regarding corporate communication.
239
 With a malleable fiduciary 
duty of disclosure based on encapsulated trust, corporations will 
continually be obligated to reflect on the quantitative and qualitative 
sufficiency of their public disclosures.
240
 Rather than providing a one-size-
fits-all disclosure standard for every corporation, a fiduciary disclosure 
duty based on encapsulated trust requires a rather disciplined 
organizational introspection. What marks sufficient disclosure for any 
corporation will depend on the dialogue between the corporation and its 
constituencies regarding the substance of corporate disclosures as well as 
the manner of those disclosures.
241
 The point is not that corporations must 
heed every stakeholder preference regarding information disclosure. 
Rather, by instantiating encapsulated trust in a disclosure duty, 
corporations will continually refine as a matter of course their own 
understanding of what marks appropriate disclosure practices. To be sure, 
the threat of litigation from disgruntled shareholders provides the incentive 
to engage in the reflective process. But as that practice takes hold and 
shareholders become a regular part of the dialogue regarding corporate 
 
 
 238. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. But see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 
907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (asserting that it would be inappropriate to apply modern notions of 
corporate ―best practices‖ to disclosure obligations). 
 240. See Hamermesh, supra note 121, at 1152–54. 
 241. See Z. Jill Barclift, Codes of Ethics and State Fiduciary Duties: Where Is the Line?, 1 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 237, 239 n.9 (2008) (describing under various ―best practices‖ disclosure 
initiatives, the need for interaction and discourse among a wide range of corporate actors and 
stakeholders). 
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disclosure practices, the instances of litigation should wane. For by 
engaging and taking seriously the discourse, the corporations fulfill their 
duty based on encapsulated trust and thereby insulate themselves from 
shareholder attack. 
B. Engagement 
A fiduciary duty of disclosure based on encapsulated trust promotes 
much greater engagement by corporate constituencies. As already 
discussed in the context of efficiency, attaining the competence necessary 
to understand adequately the interests of shareholders requires 
corporations to engage in robust discourse with shareholders.
242
 But how 
could corporations actually approach that discourse? What mechanisms 
would enable corporations to fulfill their fiduciary duty?  
A duty to take seriously the concerns of shareholders would likely 
accelerate the development of intermediating organizations
243
 that already 
play an important role in the CSR movement. Although corporations could 
attempt to survey the viewpoints of every shareholder, gaining the 
requisite sense of competence regarding shareholder interests seems 
possible through much less extraordinary means. In particular, 
corporations could engage in regular consultation with shareholder or 
other constituency groups. Already, a large number of non-governmental 
organizations exists that represent shareholder concerns, whether 
regarding environmental sustainability, organic production, fair labor 
standards, non-discrimination policies, or a host of other matters.
244
 In an 
effort to gain competence regarding the views that shareholders actually 
possess, corporations might look to these organizations as surrogates for 
articulating shareholder preferences.
245
  
The involvement of shareholder advocacy groups in corporate decision 
making could raise concerns for business managers and investors.
246
 Part 
 
 
 242. See supra Part IV.A. 
 243. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 291, 305–06 (2007) (addressing the growth of various interest groups that 
represent stakeholder claims to corporate managers). 
 244. See R. Timothy S. Breen et al., The Chief Strategy Officer, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 1, 2007, at 
84; Siebecker, supra note 9, at 616–17. 
 245. Howard B. Adler, The Emerging Role of Activist Shareholders and Destabilizers, 922 
PRACTISING L. INST. 131, 141 (1996); Steven A. Rosenblum, Proxy Reform, Takeovers, and 
Corporate Control: The Need for a New Orientation, 17 J. CORP. L. 185, 209–10 (1991) (describing 
the potential for enhanced communication between shareholders, stakeholder groups, and corporate 
managers). 
 246. See generally Clive Crook, The Good Company, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2005, at 1–6 
(discussing potential deleterious effects on business management and public welfare associated with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
170 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:115 
 
 
 
 
of the problem focuses on the aggregate effect of nettlesome distractions 
that shareholder advocates pose for officers and directors.
247
 Another 
important concern targets the basic judgment of groups that promote 
particular issue preferences that may be at odds with the overall good of 
the corporation or with the values of competing shareholder groups.
248
 
Related to that concern is a question of whether groups voicing opinions 
actually represent shareholder opinions. To the extent those advocacy 
groups present peculiar viewpoints not possessed by shareholders, the 
interests encapsulated by the corporation are not authentic. As a result, the 
level of disclosure adopted would stray from an efficient level.  
Even if excessive shareholder involvement in business management 
might produce deleterious effects for the corporation, however, attending 
to the views of shareholder or other constituency groups regarding 
disclosure issues seems much less problematic. After all, what remains at 
stake is simply the quantity and quality of corporate disclosures. The 
discourse between the corporation and its constituencies need not engage 
the substantive merits of the advocacy groups‘ interests or heed particular 
calls for changing corporate practices outside the disclosure context. 
Instead, what simply matters is taking into account the interests expressed 
regarding the disclosure of corporate information.
249
 While disclosure of 
information might fuel constituency groups, providing desired data could 
also quell shareholder foment.
250
 In any event, at least with respect to 
understanding shareholder interests regarding what constitutes adequate 
disclosure, the enhanced role of shareholder or constituency advocacy 
groups seems rather benign. 
Beyond those bodies that directly advocate certain shareholder or 
stakeholder interests, organizations that develop standards for disclosure 
would seem to provide an increasingly important source for understanding 
shareholder interests regarding disclosure itself. Currently, a variety of 
governmental, non-governmental, and for-profit organizations attempt to 
craft standards for corporate communication. For example, the United 
Nations, though its Global Compact,
251
 and groups like the Global 
 
 
compliance with stakeholder demands for CSR). 
 247. See, e.g., Chuck Jaffe, When Making Money Takes a Back Seat to Advocacy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
26, 2006. 
 248. See Clive Cook, The World According to CSR: Good Corporate Citizens Believe that 
Capitalism Is Wicked but Redeemable, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2006, at 6, 8. 
 249. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 250. See POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 26, at 8. 
 251. The Global Compact articulates a uniform set of social and environmental principles to foster 
responsible corporate citizenship. See United Nations Procurement Division, The Global Compact, 
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Reporting Initiative
252
 promulgate standards for disclosure that 
corporations voluntarily embrace.  
Emphasizing the role of these standard-making entities may seem to 
undermine the flexibility of a common law fiduciary duty of disclosure. 
Were those organizations to provide some legal sanction for the level of 
disclosure announced, their efforts might undercut some significant 
benefits associated with a fiduciary duty of disclosure based on 
encapsulated trust. But as hortatory entities that simply encourage similar 
disclosure methods and accounting principles, what seems to develop is a 
global market for disclosure standards.
253
 That market could provide a 
springboard or an initial framework for understanding the parochial 
disclosure preferences of shareholders in any particular corporate setting. 
In a fundamental sense, embracing a fiduciary duty of disclosure based 
on encapsulated interest fosters robust engagement by corporate 
constituencies. Although excessive shareholder involvement in business 
management might negatively affect corporate effectiveness, in the realm 
of gathering information about disclosure preferences, the dialogue seems 
essential to producing an efficient level of corporate communication.  
C. Ethics 
Beyond efficiency and engagement, encapsulated trust stimulates 
ethical business and legal practices. By mandating more thoughtful 
consideration of constituency interests, encapsulated trust encourages a 
discourse that situates corporations within communal contexts. Fostering 
the notion of the corporation as contextually situated rather than isolated 
will inevitably spark a greater sensitivity to the purposes and repercussions 
of corporate practices, from both internal and external vantage points.
254
 
 
 
http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2008). 
 252. According to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Web site, the GRI ―is a large multi-
stakeholder network of thousands of experts, in dozens of countries worldwide, who participate in 
GRI‘s working groups and governance bodies, use the GRI Guidelines to report, access information in 
GRI-based reports, or contribute to develop the Reporting Framework in other ways—both formally 
and informally.‖ See Global Reporting Initiative, Who we are, http://www.globalreporting.org/ 
AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2008). 
 253. See Pitts, supra note 26, at 483 (―This decade has witnessed proliferating company and 
industry codes of conduct, global and sector-specific multistakeholder initiatives, monitoring standards 
and organizations, labeling and certification schemes, NGO-based guidelines, reporting standards, and 
legislative, judicial, and administrative law developments on an almost daily basis.‖). 
 254. See Goran Svensson & Greg Wood, Proactive Versus Reactive Business Ethics Performance: 
A Conceptual Framework of Profile Analysis and Case Illustrations, 4 CORP. GOV. 18, 23 (2004):  
[T]he conceptual discussion of business ethics is linked to a micro level in the society. This 
means that the internal perception is a point of reference for the forthcoming discussion of 
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That change reflects an improved ethical outlook, for it marks an enhanced 
mindfulness of the organization itself.
255
 Self awareness, rather than 
willful blindness, represents an essential component of ethical conduct.
256
  
Moreover, embracing encapsulated trust as the animating principle of 
disclosure obligations will inevitably cause individuals within the 
corporate structure to become more ethically self aware.
257
 The principles 
guiding an institution affect significantly perceptions of institutional 
identity.
258
 And this does not just affect the directors and officers who 
directly bear the fiduciary duties—to the extent the language of trust 
becomes a part of daily discourse within the organization‘s structure, 
individuals throughout the organization will embrace more readily that 
concept as a constitutive part of their roles in the corporation.
259
 With a 
heightened awareness of the importance of trust to the basic obligations of 
the corporation, corporate actors will embed that sensibility in their 
approach to doing business.  
The means by which that language of trust gets introduced to the 
corporation focuses on the enhanced ethical role of lawyers.
260
 Both 
internal general counsels and outside corporate lawyers bear the 
responsibility of explicating for corporate actors the behaviors and 
practices that comport with existing legal standards.
261
 Absent a 
 
 
business ethics performance in the marketplace. The internal perception may be that of the 
employer, the employees and/or the owners/shareholders. Another point of reference is the 
external perception. The external perception may be that of the customers, the suppliers, 
and/or other publics. 
Id. 
 255. See Neil Buck, Corporate Governance—More than a State of Mind?, in GOVERNING THE 
CORPORATION 273, 273 (Justin O‘Brien ed., 2005) (arguing that ―governance needs to be at least a 
state of mind first among the Board and high officials and before the systems procedures, culture and 
behaviours necessary to sustain it can follow‖). 
 256. See Kent Greenfield, Corporate Ethics in a Devilish System, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 427, 433–
34 (2008). 
 257. Id.; see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory For Actualizing 
Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2007) (discussing how embracing a rhetoric of 
social responsibility can promote ethical outlooks of various corporate actors). 
 258. Fairfax, supra note 257, at 805–10 (discussing how corporate policies and governance 
practices affect perceptions of corporate identity). 
 259. See Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, 
Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 569, 569–71 (1999). 
 260. See Pitts, supra note 26, at 484:  
[N]o lawyer interfacing with corporations, or working within one, can afford to be ignorant of 
CSR‘s basic content, principles, and processes or the variety of existing soft and hard law 
instruments that can either cause problems and/or offer solutions when CSR issues and 
dilemmas arise. . . . [N]eglecting to consider these issues will increasingly amount to failure 
of professional responsibility and of directors‘ fiduciary duties. 
Id. 
 261. See M. Peter Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or 
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philosophically robust encapsulated interest account of trust serving as the 
basis for a fiduciary duty of disclosure, the ethical obligation of zealous 
representation
262
 enables lawyers to counsel corporate clients on the range 
of disclosure practices that, with differing levels of risk, arguably comply 
with legal mandates.
263
 The project seems entirely consequentialist and 
focuses simply on the information disclosed.  
Within the framework of a fiduciary duty of disclosure based on 
encapsulated trust, zealous representation necessarily involves an attention 
to process rather than simply to the consequences of compliance. Why? 
For at a minimum, zealous representation requires attending to the 
controlling legal standards. When the standard is encapsulated trust, 
satisfying that standard requires embracing a method of discourse. Even if 
lawyers still provide counsel at the base minimum necessary to comport 
with the law,
264
 the role of lawyers within the corporate setting necessarily 
becomes one of educating corporate actors about the meaning, import, and 
process of encapsulated trust. Perhaps surprising, it is corporate lawyers, 
then, who serve as the prime movers in enhancing business ethics.
265
 It is 
the lawyers who instill and monitor the practices that satisfy the dictates of 
encapsulated trust. Clearly, nothing about the substance of encapsulated 
trust alters the basic ethical mandate of zealous representation that lawyers 
owe their clients. But in counseling about what satisfies encapsulated trust, 
corporate lawyers take on the role of instilling ethical practices in their 
clients rather than simply identifying the outcome that marks minimum 
compliance. 
Thus, an encapsulated interest account of trust provides a strong basis 
for a duty of disclosure and fits rather comfortably within the existing 
fiduciary framework for officer and director duties. Moreover, embracing 
that philosophically disciplined approach promotes an efficient quantity 
and quality of corporate disclosures, encourages more robust dialogue 
 
 
Informers?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 833, 841–42 (2004) (―When representing a client as an adviser, the 
lawyer‘s main function is to provide the client with an informed understanding of the client‘s legal 
rights and obligations and to explain their practical implications.‖). 
 262. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT (2002). 
 263. For a detailed discussion of the ethical tensions facing inside counsel in advising corporate 
clients, see Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1001–29 (2005).  
 264. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-
Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. 
L. REV. 411, 434–37 (2005) (discussing the ―minimalist‖ ethical approach to legal counseling). 
 265. See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in 
Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213 (2000) (discussing how adopting a more holistic 
approach to legal counseling could produce improvements in business ethics and prevent corporate 
scandals). 
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between corporations and the constituencies they serve, and produces 
enhanced ethical business and legal practices.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Crafting appropriate regulatory structures for the world‘s financial 
markets requires a nuanced, interdisciplinary understanding of the nature 
of corporations, the internal and external factors influencing corporate 
behavior, and the relationships between corporations, stakeholders, and 
society in general. Such a comprehensive approach simply attempts to 
inject realism into regulation. To diminish threats to market integrity, 
regulatory policies should better attend to the complex web of social, 
economic, and political factors affecting corporate incentives and function 
over time. 
With respect to the tragedy of transparency threatening the viability of 
CSR, articulating a fiduciary duty of disclosure based on an encapsulated 
interest account of trust could help limit abuses of corporate power and 
promote greater corporate sensitivity to the communities they inhabit. 
Moreover, by attending more accurately to the interests of shareholders 
and other stakeholders regarding the quality and quantity of corporate 
communications, an encapsulated trust based duty of disclosure will 
promote efficient corporate communication, greater stakeholder 
engagement, and more ethical legal and business practices. Locating 
disclosure obligations in such a philosophically disciplined fiduciary duty 
would not guarantee completely accurate and comprehensive corporate 
communication. But such a shift would provide a means to sustain the 
vitality of the growing CSR and SRI movements. Although other paths 
may exist, a reinvigorated fidelity to trust provides a simple route to 
escape the looming tragedy of transparency. 
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